When you need it or when I die? Timing of monetary transfers from parents to children by Pasini, Giacomo et al.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Giacomo Pasini, Rob 
Alessie, and Adriaan Kalwij 
 
When you need it or when I 
die? Timing of monetary 
transfers from parents to 
children 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN: 1827-3580 
No. 34/WP/2016 
 
      
W o r k i n g  P a p e r s   
D e p a r t m e n t  o f  E c o n o m i c s   
C a ’  F o s c a r i  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  V e n i c e   
N o .  3 4 / W P / 2 0 1 6  
ISSN 1827-3580 
The Working Paper Series  
is available only on line    
(http://www.unive.it/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=86302) 
For editorial correspondence, please contact: 
wp.dse@unive.it  
 Department of Economics Ca’ Foscari University of Venice 
Cannaregio 873, Fondamenta San Giobbe 
30121 Venice Italy 
Fax: ++39 041 2349210 
 
 
 
 
 
When you need it or when I die? Timing of monetary transfers 
from parents to children 
 
Giacomo Pasini  
Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Department of Economics  
NETSPAR, Network for Studies on Pensions, Ageing and Retirement 
 
Rob Alessie  
University of Groningen  
NETSPAR, Network for Studies on Pensions, Ageing and Retirement 
 
Adriaan Kalwij 
Utrecht University School of Economics 
NETSPAR, Network for Studies on Pensions, Ageing and Retirement 
 
 
Abstract 
This  paper  inves t iga tes  the  t im ing  of  wea l th  t ransfers  be tween  genera t ions .  
We deve lop  an  over lapp ing  genera t ions  mode l  in  wh ich  each  genera t ion  can  
borrow aga ins t  i t s  fu ture  income but  not  aga ins t  expec ted  beques t .  As  a  
resu l t ,  genera t ions  re la t ive ly  poorer  than  the i r  parents  may  end  up  not  
smooth ing  consumpt ion .  We prove  tha t  i f  wea l th  t ransfers  can  take  p lace  
ea r l i e r  in  l i f e ,  then  each  genera t ion  smooths  consumpt ion  desp i te  the  
cons t ra in t  on  borrowing  and  the  f i r s t  bes t  so lu t ion  i s  res tored .  The  mode l  
impl ies  tha t  parents  t ransfe r  resources  when  the  ch i ld ren  a re  c red it  
cons t ra ined .  Th is  impl ica t ion  i s  te s ted  us ing  Dutch  survey  da ta  on  
househo lds '  in tent ions  to  make  in te rv ivos  t ransfers  matched  w i th  
admin is t ra t ive  da ta  tha t  a l low to  cons t ruc t  a  measure  of  the  probab i l i t y  o f  
be ing  in  need  of  a  t ransfer .  A l l  in  a l l ,  the  paper  h igh l igh ts  the  impor tance  
of  in te rv ivos  t ransfers  a s  a  dev ice  tha t  househo lds  can  resor t  to  in  order  to  
mi t iga te  in te r -genera t iona l  wea l th  inequa l i t i e s .  
 
Keywords   
intervivos transfers, credit constraints, overlapping generations 
 
JEL Codes 
D12, D13, D91 
 Address for correspondence: 
Giacomo Pasini 
Department of Economics 
Ca’ Foscari University of Venice 
Cannaregio 873, Fondamenta S.Giobbe 
30121 Venezia - Italy 
Phone: (++39) 041 23491XX 
Fax: (++39) 041 2349176 
e-mail: giacomo.pasini@unive.it 
 
This Working Paper is published under the auspices of the Department of Economics of the Ca’ Foscari University of Venice. Opinions 
expressed herein are those of the authors and not those of the Department. The Working Paper series is designed to divulge preliminary or 
incomplete work, circulated to favour discussion and comments. Citation of this paper should consider its provisional character. 
 
When you need it or when I die?
Timing of monetary transfers from parents to children∗
Giacomo Pasini1,4, Rob Alessie2,4, Adriaan Kalwij3,4
1Ca’ Foscari University of Venice
2University of Groningen
3Utrecht University School of Economics
4NETSPAR, Network for Studies on Pensions, Ageing and Retirement
November 18, 2016
Abstract
This paper investigates the timing of wealth transfers between generations. We develop
an overlapping generations model in which each generation can borrow against its future
income but not against expected bequest. As a result, generations relatively poorer than
their parents may end up not smoothing consumption. We prove that if wealth transfers
can take place earlier in life, then each generation smooths consumption despite the con-
straint on borrowing and the first best solution is restored. The model implies that parents
transfer resources when the children are credit constrained. This implication is tested using
Dutch survey data on households’ intentions to make intervivos transfers matched with ad-
ministrative data that allow to construct a measure of the probability of being in need of a
transfer. All in all, the paper highlights the importance of intervivos transfers as a device
that households can resort to in order to mitigate inter–generational wealth inequalities.
JEL Classification: D12, D13, D91
Keywords: intervivos transfers, credit constraints, overlapping generations
1 Introduction
Wealth transmission between generations, and in particular from parents to their oﬀsprings,
is an important topic both from an individual and from an aggregate perspective. From a
∗The authors wish to thank Eric Bonsang, Luca Deidda, Mariacristina De Nardi, Michael Haliassos, Mike
Hurd, Rajnish Mehra, Jochen Mierau, Henri Ohlsson and Ctirad Slavik for useful comments on earlier drafts of
this paper, as well as participants at seminars at Universities of Venice, Frankfurt, Siena, Sassari, Groningen, MEA
in Munich and Sveriges Riksbank in Stockholm; conference participants at the Pensions, Savings and Retirement
Decisions Netspar theme conference in Utrecht, Netspar Pension Workshop in Amsterdam, ASSET conference in
Cyprus, FIRB conference in Padova.
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microeconomic perspective intended transfers motivated by, e.g., altruism help to extend the
standard life cycle model to accommodate for a non–declining saving profile of the elderly. As
an example, Hurd (1989) predicts a non–declining or even increasing saving pattern due to a
bequest motive plus mortality risk. From an aggregate or macroeconomic point of view, the
usual approach to study the eﬀects of fiscal policies on the wealth distribution is to set up
an overlapping generations model (OLG), where in each period the government can transfer
resources from one generation to another, e.g. using general taxation on workers to finance
pensions for the elderly, or financing current public spending by increasing public debt. The
extent to which those policies aﬀect the wealth distribution in the population and in particular
across generations, depends on the degree of altruism between older and younger individuals.
If parents can and are willing to transfer part of their resources to their children in response
to a tax–driven income shock on younger generations they may, at least partially, oﬀ–set the
negative shock (the Ricardian equivalence).
Monetary transfers from parents to children can take place at the moment of parent’s death
via bequest and during life via intervivos. Therefore, conditional on having decided to transfer
money to children, parents face the choice of the timing of such a transfer. If the only driving
mechanism behind transfers is altruism and capital markets are perfect, once legal bindings on
end-of-life transfers are taken into account, bequests and intervivos should be perfect substitutes.
Several authors motivate the existence of intervivos as responses to tax incentives on monetary
gifts versus end of life transfers (Page, 2003; Poterba, 2001; McGarry, 2000; Bernheim, Lemke,
and Scholz, 2004; Joulfaian, 2004). An alternative approach, followed by Bernheim, Shleifer, and
Summers (1985); Cox (1987) and Alessie, Angelini, and Pasini (2014) is to introduce exchange
motives: transfers are motivated not only by altruism but also by strategic considerations to
incentivize children to take good care of their parents. Empirical evidence does not always
support the existence of tax reasons nor bequest motives to anticipate transfers, while there
is extensive literature highlighting good reasons to postpone transfers such as a mean of self–
insurance against longevity or health risk (Carroll, 1997). Still McGarry (1999) argues that
uncertainty about future events does not necessarily imply lower intervivos and higher bequests.
Based on a representative sample of American households from the Health and Retirement
Study, McGarry observes that intervivos transfers go more often to less well–oﬀ children while
bequests are divided equally across oﬀsprings. In order to rationalize these observations she
develops a two period model that predicts diﬀering behavior towards intervivos transfers and
bequests due to uncertainty about future income of the children and due to the fact that children
face binding credit constraints.
In this paper we take a standard OLG model as, e.g., in Blanchard and Fischer (1989) as
a starting point and without introducing any uncertainty nor market friction we show that
intervivos serve as a device to reach an optimal consumption profile if generations have diﬀerent
lifetime income and cannot borrow against bequest. Compared to previous attempts to model
intervivos transfers, we introduce only a minimal deviation from a standard life cycle model with
altruism: we still assume that each generation can borrow up to their entire lifetime earnings –
in other words, financial markets are perfect – but they cannot borrow against future bequest.
The eﬀect of relaxing the assumption that individuals can borrow against future bequests is
that generations with relatively low lifetime income compared to their predecessors are not able
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to smooth consumption. Nevertheless if each generation can anticipate part of the transfer by
means of intervivos, the first best solution is restored. In other words, each generation transfers
resources when the next one is credit constrained. An example are cash transfers (or collateral
provision) to children who need a mortgage to buy a house early in their working life.
The main advantage of our choice compared to alternative models is that the assumptions we are
making aﬀect the way households reach their first best solution, i.e. consumption smoothing, but
not the equilibrium characteristics. This means our life cycle model can be harmlessly integrated
into any extension to the standard OLG framework and it is therefore fully compatible with the
existing macroeconomic literature on wealth transmission.
One prediction of our model is that inter–generational transfers occur when the young generation
needs them to smooth consumption. We test this prediction on the Dutch DNB Household
Survey (DHS), that have the unique feature of including very specific questions on intervivos
intentions. Survey data are supplemented by administrative data used to construct a measure
of the probability of having at least one child in need of the transfer. Results support the
prediction of our proposed theoretical model that a transfer is most likely to occur when the
next generation is credit constrained and the estimation procedure is robust to a number of
diﬀerent specifications. We therefore provide theoretical and empirical microfoundations to
OLG models which allow for bequests and intervivos transfers: if borrowing against bequest is
not allowed the timing of transfers is determined by the relative diﬀerence in life-time earnings
between generations, and each generation smooths consumption.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we develop the theoretical model. Section 3
describes the survey and administrative data. Section 4 provides the details of the empirical
analysis and baseline results, while robustness checks are discussed in sections 5. The last section
summarizes the contributions of the paper and concludes.
2 An economic model for the timing of transfers
The starting point is an Overlapping Generations (OLG) model with downward altruism a` la
Becker (1974), i.e. each generation’s utility depends on next generation’s utility. The utility
function of a generation born at time t, Vt is
Vt = u(c1t) + u(c2t+1) + αVt+1, t = 1, . . . , T − 1 (1)
where an individual born at time t consumes c1t in period t and c2t+1 in period t + 1. Each
generation lives for two periods. The per–period utility u(cjτ ) is an increasing and strictly
concave function of cjτ , α measures the degree of altruism. In order to focus on the essential
features of our model we follow Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra (2002, 2007): first, we
stick to a representative agent model without introducing heterogenous preferences. Second, we
abstract from the labour–leisure trade–oﬀ, i.e. the wage process is exogenous. Moreover, the
model is fully deterministic as e.g. in Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987): income yit is known to
each generation and greater or equal than zero in each period. Finally, we assume that both the
interest rate rt and the rate of time preference θ are equal to zero.1
1Compared to Blanchard and Fischer (1989) and following their notation notation, θ = rt = 0. The drawback
of this simplifying assumption is that all the comparisons between amounts are amplified due to the absence of
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It is worth noticing that our aim is to study the timing of the transfer and not the reason why this
transfer takes place. We argue it is altruism to motivate intergenerational transfers as in Becker
and Barro (1998), but this is by no means a crucial assumption. If Vt+1 is interpreted as utility
of generation t out of bequest and α as a simple rescaling weight, the maximization problem can
be rewritten according to Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra (2007) and encompasses the
altruistic model we presented, but also egoistic set ups where bequest is motivated e.g. by warm
glow considerations a` la Andreoni (1990) as in Hurd (1989) or Kopczuk and Lupton (2007).
Table 1 provides a description of the timing structure of the model. In period t generation t
is in his first period of life. He receives labour income y1t and intervivos Rt−1 transferred by
previous generation t−1. During period 1 generation t consumes c1t, saves for the second period
At and allocates Rt to intervivos transfer for the next generation t+ 1. The intervivos transfer
takes place at the end of the first period of life of each generation. In period 2, generation t
receives labour income y2t+1, his own savings from period 1 At, and the bequest transferred by
generation t − 1, bt. During period 2 generation t consumes c2t+1 and allocates resources to
bequest bt+1 to be left to generation t + 1 at the end of period 2 , i.e. at death. We follow
the literature on bequests and rule out inter-generational transfers from children to parents, in
other words we assume intervivos and bequests cannot be negative: Rs, bs ≥ 0, ∀s.
2.1 The basic model: no intervivos and no credit constraints
We first solve the model in the case intervivos are all set to zero, Rs = 0, ∀s and each generation
can borrow against all future resources. If this is the case, generation t maximizes his utility Vt
with respect to his choice variables c1t, c2t+1, At, bt+1:
max
c1t,c2t+1,At,bt+1
u(c1t) + u(c2t+1) + αVt+1 (2a)
subject to the following constraints:
c1t = y1t −At (2b)
c2t+1 = y2t+1 +At + bt − bt+1 (2c)
bt+1 ≥ 0 (2d)
With b1 known and given at time t = 0. We rule out corner solutions at zero consumption
from the beginning and throughout the paper (c1t > 0 and c2t+1 > 0). This positive net–worth
constraint is satisfied if we assume the within period utility functions are of the CRRA type, or
more mildly if lim
x→0
u′(x) =∞. From constraints (2b),(2c), c1t > 0 and c2t+1 > 0 it follows that
At ∈ (−y2t+1 − bt, y1t) (3)
This means generation t receives the bequest bt in period 2, but can borrow and consume out
of it in period 1 as well.
Since the choices regarding money transfers of generation t aﬀect behavior of the following
generation, the model must be solved iteratively. I.e., conditional on the transfer from generation
an inter-temporal discount.
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T − 1 to generation T , bT , the maximization can be solved for generation T − 1 and then going
backwards for each previous generation. The model is solved if a transversality condition assures
bT is optimal (Kamihigashi, 2008). A natural formulation of this transversality condition that
does not entail any loss of generality, is to assume time is finite, i.e. generation T − 1 is the
last one and lives for two periods, T − 1 and T . As a consequence bT = 0. Maximization of
generation T − 1 does not depend on successive generations and concavity of the per–period
utility function u(cjt+i) leads to consumption smoothing.
c1T−1 = c2T =
y1T−1 + y2T + bT−1
2
(4)
The terminal condition bT = 0 implies that generation T − 1 maximizes his utility only with
respect to c1T−1, c2T , or equivalently with respect only to AT−1. The value of AT−1 at the
optimum depends on the bequest generation T − 1 receives from generation T − 2, bT−1:
AT−1(bT−1) =
y1T−1 − y2T − bT−1
2
(5)
Generation T − 2 anticipates that generation T − 1 will optimize his own utility taking T − 2
bequest bT−1 as given. AT−1 at the optimum is a function only of exogenous income and a
choice variable of generation T − 2, namely bT−1. As a consequence, utility of generation T − 1,
VT−1, is a function only of choice variables of generation T − 2. Since generation T − 2 utility
depends on VT−1, generation T −2 observes the exogenous stream of income of generation T −1,
and transfers bT−1 in order to maximize VT−1. This is the same strategic interaction described
in the two generations model of Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoﬀ (1997). Formally, this means
generation T − 2 optimization can be rewritten adding AT−1 among the choice variables and
adding generation T − 1 constraints:
max
AT−2,AT−1,bT−1
u(c1T−2) + u(c2T−1) + α [u(c1T−1) + u(c2T )] (6a)
subject to
c1T−2 = y1T−2 −AT−2 (6b)
c2T−1 = y2T−1 +AT−2 + bT−2 − bT−1 (6c)
bT−1 ≥ 0 (6d)
c1T−1 = y1T−1 −AT−1 (6e)
c2T = y2T +AT−1 + bT−1 (6f)
(6g)
From the first order conditions follows that
AT−2 =
y1T−2 + bT−1 − y2T−1 − bT−2
2
(7)
which leads to consumption smoothing:
c1T−2 = c2T−1 =
y1T−2 + y2T−1 + bT−2 − bT−1
2
(8)
5
Now, VT−1 depends on choice variables of generation T − 2, namely bT−1, but not on choice
variables of generation T − 3. This does not depend on the specific time period: At and Vt at
the optimum depend on generation t choice variable bt+1 and on choice variables of generation
t− 1, namely bt, but not on choice variables of generation t− 2:
Vt = u(c1t) + u(c2t+1) + αVt+1(bt+1) (9)
and
At(bt, bt+1) =
y1t − y2t+1 + bt+1 − bt
2
In other words, (generic) generation t decision about bequest will aﬀect directly his own con-
sumption and consumption of generation t+1, but not consumption of the successive generations.
This is important since it limits the strategic interactions of each generation: generation t moves
second in a dynamic game of complete information with generation t − 1, while moves first in
an identical game played with generation t + 1, and he does not need to account for behavior
of generations other than the previous and the following one. Given this setting, each genera-
tion smooths income diﬀerences between first and second period in order to keep consumption
constant and at equilibrium:
c1t = c2t+1 =
y1t + y2t+1 + bt − bt+1
2
(10)
Moreover, altruism induces each generation to use bequests to smooth income diﬀerences with
the next generation. This is a well-known result that corresponds to, e.g., the first best solution
of the household part of the OLG model in Blanchard and Fischer (1989). Formally, if generation
t is willing to bequeath we are at an interior solution for bt+1:
MRSt,t+1 =
u′(c2t+1)
u′(c2t+2)
= α (11)
This means the degree of altruism equals the marginal rate of substitution between own and next
generation’s consumption, thus the closer α is to 1, the more consumption is smoothed between
generations.2 If generation t is not willing to bequeath to generation t + 1 (non–negativity
constraint on bequest is binding), then
u′(c2t+1) = αu
′ (c2t+2) + µt+1 ⇒MRSt,t+1 =
u′(c2t+1)
u′(c2t+2)
> α (12)
If generation t+ 1 is lifetime richer than generation t, and/or the degree of altruism is low (low
α), then it is likely that MRSt,t+1 > α and therefore bt+1 = 0.
2.2 The model with credit constraints but no intervivos
In section 2.1 we assumed that via saving and borrowing, resources can be consumed in the first
or second period, independently from the period in which they are eﬀectively at the disposal of
2If α ≤ 1, from (11), c1t = c2t+1 > c1t+1 = c2t+2. If α > 1, from (11), c1t = c2t+1 < c1t+1 = c2t+2.
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households. This means assuming that households can freely save or borrow against own future
income, but also against future bequest. In order for individuals to borrow against bequests, it
means banks and financial institutions lend to dynasties, not to single individuals. This may be
reasonable in a model with strong altruism, e.g. as in Laitner (1992) where parents treat their
descendants as they were themselves. We do not want to restrict the attention to this special
case, therefore we adjust equation (3) and assume that each generation can freely borrow against
his own future earnings, but not against bequests. Formally, generation t maximizes his utility
Vt with respect to his choice variables c1t, c2t+1, At and bt+1:
max
c1t,c2t+1,At,bt+1
u(c1t) + u(c2t+1) + αVt+1 (13a)
subject to the following constraints:
c1t = y1t −At (13b)
c2t+1 = y2t+1 +At + bt − bt+1 (13c)
At ≥ −y2t+1 (13d)
bt+1 ≥ 0 (13e)
With b1 known and given at time t = 0. The credit limit, formalized in constraint (13d), states
that generation t can borrow up to his whole second period income but not against bequest. It
follows that
At ∈ [−y2t+1, y1t).
As in section 2.1, to solve the model we use backward induction and exploit the fact that each
generation solves its problem conditional on the next generation optimal behavior. Generation
t, conditional upon the optimal bequest of generation t+ 1 to the following generation denoted
by bt+2, faces the following optimization problem:
Vt(bt) = max
At,At+1,bt+1
u(c1t) + u(c2t+1) + α [u(c1t+1) + u(c2t+2) + αVt+2(bt+2)] (14a)
subject to the following constraints
c1t = y1t −At (14b)
c2t+1 = y2t+1 +At + bt − bt+1 (14c)
c1t+1 = y1t+1 −At+1 (14d)
c2t+2 = y2t+2 +At+1 + bt+1 − bt+2 (14e)
bt+1 ≥ 0 (14f)
Aτ ≥ −y2τ+1, τ = t, t+ 1 (14g)
The credit constraint (14g) implies
At =
y1t + bt+1 − y2t+1 − bt
2
≥ −y2t+1 (15)
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Equation (15) can be rewritten as follows:
bt ≤ y1t + y2t+1 + bt+1 (16)
Generation t smooths consumption if the bequest received bt is relatively small. This means that
if generation t does not receive any bequest (bt = 0), then he will certainly smooth. Moreover,
simple comparative statics highlights that, other things being equal, the larger is the bequest
generation t is willing to leave to generation t+ 1 (bt+1), the more likely it is that generation t
smooths consumption. This is due to the fact that each generation leaves a bequest to the next
generation at the end of the second period. The larger the bequest, the less likely it is that such
a generation will need to borrow in his first period of life in order to smooth consumption and,
therefore, also the less likely that he will be credit constrained. Equation (16) also implies that
generation t is credit constrained and does not smooth consumption if the diﬀerence between
received and given bequests bt − bt+1 is larger than lifetime earnings y1t + y2t+1. The optimal
consumption path in this case is
c1t = y1t + y2t+1 < c2t+1 = bt − bt+1
Since each generation has the same degree of altruism and the same per period utility function,
what determines whether a specific generation is credit constrained or not is heterogeneity in
income across generations. Compared to the existing literature, e.g. McGarry (1999, 2000);
Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoﬀ (1997), there is no need to invoke heterogeneous preferences
nor unexpected income shocks to observe a suboptimal solution for a given generation. For
a generation to be credit constrained in this model it suﬃces that his permanent income is
relatively low compared to previous generation’s permanent income. Equation (16) implies that
the diﬀerence in permanent income between generation t− 1 and t must be very large in order
to observe t not smoothing. Note anyway this is simply an artifact of two combined simplifying
assumptions: first, we set the intertemporal discount factor and interest rates equal to zero.
Second, we assumed there are no market frictions and therefore each generation can entirely
borrow his own second period income. If we assume financial markets are not perfect and
individual can borrow only a (1 − δ) fraction of their second period income where δ ∈ (0, 1),
then (14g) becomes
Aτ ≥ −(1− δ)y2τ+1, τ = t, t+ 1
and (16) becomes
bt ≤ y1t + (1− 2δ)y2t+1 + bt+1
Now, if we assume agents can borrow only δ = 0.5 of their future income, it is enough that the
diﬀerence between received and given bequests bt − bt+1 is larger than first period income y1t
and generation t will not smooth.3 The crucial point is that if borrowing against bequest is
3Note that if δ > 0.5 we should add additional assumptions on the relative magnitude of y1τ and y2τ+1, and/or
a positive interest rate rτ in order to close the model. As we already mentioned, this would complicate the analysis
without providing further insight regarding the key results of the paper.
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not possible, without invoking any further deviation from the standard, textbook OLG model
presented in section 2.1, we can observe suboptimal solutions to the model, i.e. some generations
do not smooth consumption and choose second–best solutions.
2.3 The full model with bequests and intervivos transfers
Now suppose that generation t may also receive an intervivos transfer Rt−1 at the beginning
of period t from the previous generation, and can transfer via intervivos to the next generation
t+ 1 at the end of period t (Rt). The full maximization problem is the following:
max
c1t,c2t+1,Rt,bt+1
u(c1t) + u(c2t+1) + αVt+1 (17a)
subject to the following constraints
c1t = y1t −At +Rt−1 −Rt (17b)
c2t+1 = y2t+1 +At + bt − bt+1 (17c)
bt+1 ≥ 0 (17d)
Rt ≥ 0 (17e)
At ≥ −y2t+1 (17f)
With b1, R0 known and given at time t = 0. It is important to observe that we are not introducing
any fiscal incentive to prefer intervivos to bequest as in Poterba (2001) or in Nishiyama (2002).
This can be easily done, but our aim is to highlight the fact it is enough to drop the assumption
that households can borrow against bequest to observe intervivos transfers.
From constraints (17b),(17c) and (17f), as well as from the maintained assumption that c1t >
0 and c2t+1 > 0, it follows that At ∈ [−y2t+1, y1t + Rt−1 − Rt). The credit constraint still
limits the span of generation t choice about At. There are two possibilities to transfer money
between generations, intervivos and bequests, and each generations decision about transfers
aﬀects directly only the maximization problem of the next generation and not of the generations
thereafter. It is then possible to rewrite the maximization problem of generation t conditional
on the choice variables Rt+1 and bt+2 of generation t + 1 evaluated at their optimum, and to
include saving At+1 of generation t+1 among the choice variables of generation t, as well as all
the relevant constraints in the maximization problem, and solve the maximization problem of
generic generation t.
Vt(Rt−1, bt) = max
At,At+1,Rt,bt+1
u(c1t)+u(c2t+1)+α [u(c1t+1) + u(c2t+2) + αVt+2(Rt+1, bt+2)] (18a)
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subject to the following constraints
c1t = y1t −At +Rt−1 −Rt (18b)
c2t+1 = y2t+1 +At + bt − bt+1 (18c)
c1t+1 = y1t+1 −At+1 +Rt −Rt+1 (18d)
c2t+2 = y2t+2 +At+1 + bt+1 − bt+2 (18e)
bt+1 ≥ 0 (18f)
Rt ≥ 0 (18g)
Aτ ≥ −y2τ+1, τ = t, t+ 1 (18h)
The solution follows exactly the same steps as in section 2.2: we solve the model backwards
assuming transfers to the last generation (RT−1 and bT in this case) are optimal, or, without
loss of generality, time is finite and therefore RT−1 = bT = 0. If generation t is not credit
constrained, then
c1t = c2t+1 =
y1t +Rt−1 −Rt + y2t+1 + bt − bt+1
2
And from (18h)
bt −Rt−1 ≤ y1t + y2t+1 + bt+1 −Rt
That is the transfer received by generation t in his second period in excess to what he received
in the first period, bt − Rt−1 must be relatively small. If also generation t + 1 is not credit
constrained and smooths consumption, then it also holds that
bt+1 −Rt ≤ y1t+1 + y2t+2 + bt+2 −Rt+1 (19)
Again from simple comparative statics, and holding total transfers from generation t to gen-
eration t + 1 (Rt + bt+1) constant, the timing of transfers aﬀects the chances that generations
t and t + 1 are both credit constrained. If generation t postpones the transfers, i.e. bt+1 is
relatively big compared to Rt, then it is more likely generation t will not be credit constrained
while generation t+1 will be credit constrained. The reason being that a higher transfer late in
life of generation t reduces the borrowing needs for who is making the transfer, while it increases
the need to borrow of generation t + 1. We are now at the key theoretical result of the paper:
we can prove that at equilibrium each generation will set Rt in such a way the credit constraint
is not binding for generation t+ 1, that is intervivos Rt allow to restore the first best solution.
Theorem. (Intervivos transfers restore the first best solution) Suppose each generation maxi-
mizes (17a) under constraints (17b) to (17f), i.e. agents cannot borrow against bequests, but can
transfer money both via bequests and via intervivos. Moreover, suppose generation 1 does not
receive any bequest (b1 = 0), and R0 ≥ 0 is known. Then the credit constraint is never binding
and all generations smooth consumption.
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Proof. The optimization problem (17) can be rewritten as (18) and the corresponding Lagrangian
function is:
L = u(y1t −At +Rt−1 −Rt) + u(y2t+1 +At + bt − bt+1)
+ α
[
u(y1t+1 −At+1 +Rt −R
∗
t+1) + u(y2t+2 +At+1 + bt+1 − b
∗
t+2) + αVt+2(R
∗
t+1, b
∗
t+2)
]
+ µt+1(bt+1) + νt(Rt) + λt(At + y2t+1) + λt+1(At+1 + y2t+2)
From the first order conditions it follows that:
u′(c1t) = u
′(c2t+1) + λt ⇔ u
′(c1t) = u
′(c2t+1)(1 + λ
∗
t ) (20a)
αu′(c1t+1) = αu
′(c2t+2) + λt+1 ⇔ αu
′(c1t+1) = u
′(c2t+2)(α+ λ
∗
t+1) (20b)
u′(c2t+1) = αu
′(c2t+2) + µt+1 ⇔ u
′(c2t+1) = u
′(c2t+2)(α + µ
∗
t+1) (20c)
u′(c1t) = αu
′(c1t+1) + νt ⇔ u
′(c1t) = u
′(c1t+1)(α + ν
∗
t
) (20d)
where λ∗τ = λτ/u
′(c2τ+1), τ = t, t+1 denote rescaled Kuhn-Tucker multipliers corresponding to
the two liquidity constraints (18h). µ∗t+1 = µt+1/u
′(c2t+2)and ν∗t = νt/u
′(c1t+1) are the rescaled
Kuhn-Tucker multipliers corresponding to the non-negativity constraints (18f) and (18g). Equa-
tions (20) imply the following relationship between these four Kuhn-Tucker multipliers:
(α+ λ∗t+1)
α(1 + λ∗t )
=
(α+ µ∗t+1)
(α+ ν∗t )
(21)
Equality (21) rules out the possibility that only one of the four inequality constraints (18h),(18f)
and (18g) is binding (in that case only one of the four Kuhn-Tucker multipliers is positive while
the other ones are equal to zero).4 Equality (21) also rules out the following cases:
λ∗t > 0; λ
∗
t+1 = 0; µ
∗
t+1 > 0; ν
∗
t = 0
λ∗t = 0; λ
∗
t+1 > 0; µ
∗
t+1 = 0; ν
∗
t > 0
Moreover, generation t+1 cannot be at the same credit constrained (At+1 = −y2t+2, λ∗t+1 > 0)
and a non-recipent of a bequest (bt+1 = 0, µ∗t+1 > 0 because in that case period 2 consumption
of generation t+1 would not be positive according to equation (18e) (c2t+2 = −bt+2 ≤ 0). This
means that there are no admissible solutions where generation t smooths consumption while
generation t+1 is credit constrained. By using dynamic programming argument, one can easily
show that in that case the successive generations t+ 2, . . . are also not liquidity constrained.
Finally, if b1 and R0, which are known at time t = 0, are such that R0 ≥ b1 = 0, then equation
(19) hold for period 1 and therefore generation 1 is not liquidity constrained and smooths
consumption. By using the previous argument, successive generations are also not liquidity
constrained. After ruling out all the not admissible cases, we conclude that at the optimum it
holds that:
1. c1t = c2t+1 (λ∗t = 0); c
∗
1t+1 = c
∗
2t+2 (λ
∗
t+1 = 0); bt+1 > 0 (µ
∗
t+1 = 0); Rt > 0 (ν
∗
t = 0)
2. c1t = c2t+1 (λ∗t = 0); c
∗
1t+1 = c
∗
2t+2 (λ
∗
t+1 = 0); bt+1 = 0 (µ
∗
t+1 > 0); Rt = 0 (ν
∗
t > 0)
4If α = 0, then it is possible to have λ∗t > 0 and the other 3 Kuhn-Tucker multipliers diﬀerent from zero, but
in this case any transfer to the next generation reduces utility . Each generation smooths his own consumption
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That is, all generations smooth consumtion and the first best solution is restored.
A natural choice of initial values R0 and b1 is R0 = b1 = 0: in period 1 there is no previous
generation to receive transfers from. Note that anyway the condition R0 ≥ b1 = 0 can be further
relaxed: as long as equation (19) holds for period 1, then generation 1 and all the following ones
smooth consumption.
In the benchmark model presented in section 2.1, the smoothing result comes from the fact
that each generation anticipates the amount he will receive from the previous generation at
the end of period 2, and borrows against it. In the extended model we just presented, still
each generation anticipates the amount the parent wants to transfer. The parent (generation
t) knows the income the child will earn in each period and sets bt+1 − Rt in such a way the
child will not be credit constrained and will smooth consumption. Note that this does not lead
to anticipate all the transfer from the end of life as bequest to the first period as intervivos:
the only admissible solutions are such that either generation t does not transfer any resource to
generation t+1, or he transfers both via intervivos but also via bequest. This result follows from
the fact that generation t wants to smooth as well, therefore anticipates only what is strictly
necessary for generation t+ 1 to smooth his own consumption: as we explained, reducing bt+1
and increasing Rt makes it more likely that generation t becomes credit constrained. In other
words, we highlight the existence of a trade-oﬀ each generation faces, a trade-oﬀ that it is not
possible to appreciate if not in our extended life cycle model: generation t wants (bt+1 −Rt) to
be big in order to smooth his own consumption, but wants also (bt+1 −Rt) to be small in order
to let generation t+ 1 smooths as well.
Our result has a clear empirical implication: in equilibrium generation t sets intervivos and
bequest in order to relieve the credit constraint of the next generation t+ 1. The key contribu-
tion to the existing literature on inter–generational transfers is that there is no need to invoke
unexpected shocks in order to justify intervivos transfers: if the parent knows the child will have
low income during his first period, e.g. because while young the child has children himself or
buys a house, the parent can use intervivos to let the child smooth. In the next sections we
empirically test this implication.
3 Data: the DNB Household Survey and the Income Panel
Study of the Netherlands
The DNB Household Survey (DHS) is a unique data set that allows to study both psycholog-
ical and economic aspects of financial behavior. This panel survey was launched in 1993 and
comprises information on work, pensions, housing, mortgages, income, assets, loans, health,
economic and psychological concepts, and personal characteristics. We refer to Teppa, Vis et al.
(2012) for more detailed information about the DHS. The sample consists of, on average, 2,000
Dutch households per year and it is a representative sample of the Dutch-speaking population.
For our main analysis we only use data for the period 2001–2008. We start from the 2001 wave
because in order to keep the maintain representativeness in 2001 there was a major resampling.
In addition, we only include data for the years up to and including 2008 in order to avoid the
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economic crisis. As we will see in section 5 replicating the analysis on the full sample results do
not change.
Important for our paper is the questionnaire section on “economic and psychological concepts”
in which all household members are asked about their intentions about bequests and intervivos
transfers. As regards intervivos transfers, the key question (PLAN) reads as follows:
Do you give substantial amounts of money to your children in order to transfer part
of your capital to them, or are you planning to do so in the future, e.g. every year?
1. no
2. yes, I already give substantial amounts now
3. yes, I am planning to give substantial amounts in the future
4. don’t know
Each respondent could give at most one answer as no multiple answers were allowed. This
question is asked only to respondents with children. Figure 1 reports age profiles of each answer.
Values on cohort/age cells with less than 5 observations are set to missing in order to avoid peaks
due to low frequency of answers. For the same reason, we consider in this figure only individuals
aged 20–80.5 Age profiles follow the intuition: as people age, they first start planning to transfer
in the future and gradually reduce such a planning and start to actually transfer. There are no
clear cohort eﬀects.
The DHS contains also questions about monetary transfers within the family, in particular
respondents are asked whether they gave money to any member of their family in the year prior
to the interview, and which amount was transferred. These information can be used to proxy
intervivos, but diﬀerently from PLAN they are meant to capture transfers to any family members
and not only to children, in particular respondents may transfer money to their parents, rather
than their children. Moreover, compared to PLAN they refer only to the year prior to the
interview. We, therefore, do not use this information to replace PLAN, but only to restrict to
large intervivos for a sensitivity analysis in section 5.
The dataset covering the period 2001-208 contains 7152 individuals and 26198 year-person ob-
servations. The DHS questionnaire is administered to all household members older than 16. We
restrict the attention to household heads and their spouses or cohabiting partners, and given
that we are looking at intervivos transfers we focus on respondents with at least one child. Once
observations with missing values in key variables are deleted, the estimation sample consists of
1892 individuals for 6648 year-person observations. Lastly, we are interested in parents trade-oﬀ
between relieving the credit constraint of (one of) the children and postponing a transfer to
smooth his or her own consumption. As we saw in section 2.3, a parent who is poorer than
his child can optimally decide not to make an intervivos transfer despite the child is in need of
money. If this is the case, the data would not allow to validate the model. Therefore we restrict
the analysis to homeowners. Our final sample consists of 1465 individuals and 5053 year-person
observations.
5Cohorts are always defined over a ten years period in order to have a reasonable number of observations in
each of them.
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The available information about respondents’ children in the DHS is limited to age and gender,
there is not a measure of children income nor of children wealth. For this reason, we resort to
the Income Panel Study of the Netherlands (IPO) to compute a proxy of the presence of credit
constraints. IPO is an administrative database of individual incomes collected by Statistics
Netherlands from oﬃcial records such as tax records, population registry, institutions that pay
out (insurance) benefits and the department of housing (because of rent subsidies). The IPO
is a representative sample of the Dutch population of, on average, about 95,000 individuals
per year from 1995 onward. Most important for our study is that IPO contains data on the
demographic compositions of the households the individuals belong to and whether he or she (or
his or her partner) is a homeowner. Individuals remain in the panel for as long as they are alive
and residing in the Netherlands. We compute the hazard rate by age of having a child in the
subsequent year (i.e. the probability of a child being born conditional on yet having children),
the hazard rate of being a homeowner (i.e. the probability of buying a house conditional on
not yet owning one) and the hazard rate of the joint event. We use these hazards to compute
proxies of the likelihood of facing a reduction of future disposable income. Figure 2 reports the
hazard rates by age based on the IPO years 1995-2010.6 The hazard rate of being a homeowner
peaks right before age 30, while the hazard rate of having a child rises until age 33 and then
declines faster than the housing hazard rate. The hazard rate of the joint event is relatively low
at each age.
We merge the three hazard rates to the DHS data based on the age of each child in the household.
For each child we can compute the hazard rate for the union of the two events: having the first
child in the subsequent year or buying the first home in the subsequent year. The final step is
to compute the variable haz-union for each respondent as the probability that at least one of
the children has a child for the first time in the subsequent year, or at least one of the children
buys a house for the first time. In order to compute such a variable we have to assume that the
choices of each child are independent of the choices of his or her brothers and sisters. We will
use this variable as our preferred proxy for the likelihood that at least one child is in need of a
transfer: the identifying assumption is that parents with higher haz-union probability are more
likely to have at least one child with a binding credit constraint. The bottom left panel of figure
3 reports the distribution of haz-union by age and cohort of the respondent. The distribution is
right–skewed, and cohort diﬀerences are clear: older cohorts tend to have higher probabilities of
having children who are facing a reduction in life–time disposable income at older ages. Looking
at the top panels of the same figure, it is evident that the cohort eﬀect is due both to the hazard
rate of having a grandchild, and to the hazard rate of at least one child buying his or her first
house.
4 Empirical results
The key empirical implication of our theoretical model is that if individuals cannot borrow
against bequest, the presence of credit constraints on the child increases the probability of
observing intervivos transfers. The empirical strategy is to define a discrete indicator for the
6Hazard rates cannot be computed by year due to low frequencies. Computing them over sub-periods, it is
possible to observe only limited and gradual changes in hazard rates over time.
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presence or intention to transfer based on the variable PLAN and to regress it on haz-union.
The estimation model is the following:
dplanit = β0 + β1haz-union it + x
′
itβ + θi + µt + uit (22)
where θi are individual specific eﬀects that capture time-invariant diﬀerences across households
such as degree of altruism, µt are year specific eﬀects that capture macro shocks or cohort
diﬀerences, and uit is the idiosyncratic error term. The dependent variable dplanit takes value
0 if PLAN is equal to 1 (the respondent is not transferring, nor he is planning to transfer in the
future), or to 4 (the respondent is still undecided whether to transfer or not in the future), while
it takes value 1 if PLAN is equal to 2 or 3 (the respondent is transferring, or he is planning to
transfer in the future). This assumption will be validated as part of a large set of robustness
checks in section 5. Equation (22) is estimated by least squares when using a linear probability
model specification and by maximum likelihood for probit model specification. Standard errors
are always clustered at household level to account for common unobservables.
Income and consumption streams of each child are unobserved, and so it is the likelihood a child
is in need of a transfer to smooth consumption. The identifying assumption is that parents
with higher haz-union probabilities are more likely to have at least one child credit constrained.
Under this assumption a positive eﬀect of haz-union on dplanit might be considered empirical
evidence in favor of our theoretical model of section 2.3 and would highlight the importance
of intervivos transfers as a device that households can resort to in order to relieve the credit
constraints of their children.
The theoretical model we proposed in section 2.3 deals only with intended transfers and be-
quests, and does not model explicitly other motives behind transfers. The advantage for the
theoretical outline was that it resulted in clear predictions. However, in order to bring the
model to data we need to accommodate for other determinants of the presence and timing of
intervivos transfers. As we mentioned in the introduction, tax diﬀerentials between intervivos
and bequest can induce the parent to anticipate/postpone the transfer (Page, 2003; Poterba,
2001). Moreover, postponing the transfer allows the parent to use it as a buﬀer saving to cover
unforeseen income/wealth shocks, as for example due to unemployment, deteriorating health
conditions, or longevity (see e.g. Carroll, 1997). Precautionary savings therefore are likely to
lead to unintended bequest. Performing our empirical analysis on Dutch data turns out to be
helpful in this respect: Alessie and Kapteyn (2001) find that the pervasive welfare system in
the Netherlands is likely to reduce the incentives to postpone transfers. Similarly Hochguertel
(2003), which also uses the DHS, finds a limited role for precautionary savings in portfolio de-
cisions. Still, we have a number of variables to control for other determinants of timing and
amount of transfers. We use individual income, household financial and real wealth, and a sub-
jective question about the propensity to save in order to cover unforseen expenses7; self reported
health to control specifically for health risk, and dummies for being employed, self employed or
out of labour force to control for unemployment and income risk. All specifications include also
regional dummmies, an indicator for being living in Amsterdam, Rotterdam or Den Haag (the
7The specific question, SPAARM10 asks respondents to rate how important is “to save to have some savings
to cover unforeseen expenses” on a scale ranging from 1 to 7, where 1 means “very unimportant” and 7 “very
important”
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three biggest cities in the Netherlands) and a detailed set of controls for household composi-
tion: a dummy on whether a partner is living in the household, a quadratic polynomial in the
number of children, the age of the oldest child, the total number of grandchildren. Fixed eﬀects
specifications include a quadratic term in age to account for nonlinear age eﬀects (De Ree and
Alessie, 2011), while specifications that allow for time invariant regressors also include education
dummies and gender as well as a quadratic in age. Concerning the latter, we experimented with
higher order polynomials but that left the results virtually unchanged. Finally, as we already
mentioned, the baseline specifications is estimated on a sample of homeowners.
Table 2 reports fixed eﬀects linear probability model (LPM) estimates of equation (22). Fixed
eﬀects allows to control for individual specific unobservables aﬀecting both the decision to trans-
fer and right hand side variables. The marginal eﬀect of haz-union is positive and statistically
significant at the 10 percent level. If the probability that at least one of the children has a
child himself or buys a house in the following year increases by one percentage point, then the
chances a transfer is planned or performed increase by 0.4 percentage points. This marginal
eﬀect increases to 0.5 percentage points and becomes significant at the 5 percent level if we
augment the specification with some control variables (see columns 2 and 3 of Table 2). As
regards the other right hand side variables, the variable ‘poor health’ has a positive impact on
the probability of transferring money indicating that the exchange motive might be important
(see e.g. Cox, 1987; Alessie, Angelini, and Pasini, 2014). An alternative explanation is that poor
health indicate a relatively short residual lifespan and thus the significant marginal eﬀect may
point to an important role for tax incentives. The relation between the probability of intervivos
transfers and the number of children seems hump shaped: parents with three children transfer
most frequently. Economic resources do not play a statistically significant role8, while being
unemployed reduces the probability of transferring with respect to the omitted category, which
is being retired or out of labour force.
Fixed eﬀects estimation does not allow to estimate the eﬀects of time invariant variables. To
obtain insights into eﬀects of gender and education column (1) of Table 3 reports random eﬀects
estimates. These results are qualitatively in line with what we found with fixed eﬀect. The
estimated magnitude of the marginal eﬀect of the proxy for credit constraints is smaller: a one
percentage point increase in the probability that one of the children faces a vredit constraint
increases the chances of transferring or planning a transfer by 0.31 percentage points. As re-
gards the time invariant regressors, education level does not seem to have an impact on the
transfer via intervivos, while women are less likely to perform such a transfer. As regards the
other regressors, in this specification financial wealth is significantly positively related with the
probability to perform an intervivos transfer. As it is well-known, the random eﬀect estimator
requires the individual specific, time invariant unobservable characteristic to be (partially) un-
correlated with the observables. This is strong assumption and in column (2) of Table 3 we relax
it and estimate a model that allows for correlation between the error term and time varying right
hand side variables by including their individual specific means as suggested by Mundlak (1978).
Individual specific averages are jointly significant indicating that the RE estimates in column
(1) are inconsistent. Interestingly, gender and the education dummies become insignificant by
8We applied the following inverse hyperbolic sine transformation to income and wealth variables: IHS(x) =
ln(x+
√
x2 + 1). Notably, IHS(x) ≈ ln(2x) if x >> 0
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the inclusion of individual specific averages.9
Column (3) of Table 3 reports the average partial eﬀects based on the RE probit model using the
baseline specification outlined in equation (22). The marginal eﬀect of haz-union is significant
and similar to the point estimate obtained with a comparable RE LPM (cf. column (1) of table
3). Column (4) reports marginal eﬀects obtained from a correlated random eﬀects probit model
(Wooldridge, 1995). Again, these results are similar to the estimates obtained when using the
Mundlak model (column (2); table 3).
The overall conclusion is that our empirical results are in support of the prediction of the
theoretical model of section 2.3: a higher probability that the younger generation faces a credit
constraint increases the probability that the older generation transfers or plans to transfer part
of his wealth (an intervivos transfer) before death to relieve such a constraint.
5 Robustness checks
Results presented in section 4 may depend on sample selection and variables definition. The
first potential mis–specification may regard the dependent variable. A planned transfer may
take place a long time after the respondent declares he is willing to transfer in the future. If
this is the case, the coeﬃcient of haz-union may capture a spurious correlation. In column (1)
of table 4 the dependent variable takes value 1 only if the respondent declare that he is actually
transferring, and it is set to zero also for planned transfers. All regressions in table 4 are fixed
eﬀects estimates of a linear probability model, and are therefore comparable with our baseline
estimates in column (3) of table 2. The estimated marginal eﬀect of haz-union obtained with
this more stringent definition of the dependent variable is very similar to the baseline estimate.
In column (2) of table 4 the dependent variable takes value 1 if the respondents report to be
currently transferring, and the respondents transfers to family members (not limited to children)
at least 10,000 euros per year. The idea is that we want to focus on substantial transfers in
order to rule out small gifts. The marginal eﬀect of interest is still positive and statistically
significant, the magnitude is somewhat smaller than the baseline estimate.
As explained in the previous section, we restricted the sample for estimation to households where
the older generation has wealth to bequeath. In column (3) we extend the baseline specification
by including an interaction term between haz-union and the hyperbolic sine of net financial
wealth. The coeﬃcient corresponding to this interaction is positive and significant at the 10
percent level. This result suggests that richer parents are more likely to perform intervivos
transfers to their credit constrained children than poorer ones.
The baseline sample includes both partners within a household. If transferring is a joint house-
hold decision, then clustering standard errors may not be suﬃcient to properly account for
correlations across cross–sectional observations. Column (4) reports estimates when we in-
clude only one individual per household namely the primary respondent. The magnitude of the
marginal eﬀect of interest again is very close to the baseline case, but only significant at the 10
percent level. The smaller precision in the estimates may be due to the fact that the sample is
9The Mundlak estimates of the time–varying right hand side variables diﬀer slightly from the fixed eﬀect ones
because we have not included the individual specific averages of the year dummies.
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reduced from 5053 observations and 1465 individuals to 3191 observations relative to less than a
thousand individuals, or it may be the case that the selected household member is not in charge
of financial transfers. The last column of table 4 reports estimates computed on the full panel
rather than on the 2001-2008 period. Results are again very close to the baseline results, as
regards the marginal eﬀect of the parameter of interest.
In table 5 we consider alternative proxies for the likelihood that at least one child is in need of a
transfer to smooth consumption. In column (2) we use the hazard rate that at least one of the
children of the respondent has a first child and at least one child buys a house in the following
year. This is clearly a tighter requirement than the one used in the baseline specification: it is
reasonable to expect higher chances of being in financial distress when the two events take place
in the same year. The point estimate is in line with this expectation, but the standard error is
considerably larger than in the baseline specification due to the fact the joint event is extremely
rare. Nonetheless the point estimate is statistically significant. In column (3) we use as proxy
the probability that at least one child buys a house in the following year and in column (4) the
probability of having a grandchild in the following year. Both marginal eﬀects have a positive
and significant eﬀect and both the point estimate and the standard errors are bigger than in the
baseline case.
6 Conclusion
Overlapping generations models “hide” an assumption: young generations can borrow against
bequest. This is a very strong and, arguably, undesirable assumption as it means that banks lend
money to dynasties rather than to individuals. In this paper we first relaxed this assumption
and imposed a credit constraint to each generation equal to its own life cycle income. We showed
that if financial markets are perfect but it is not possible to borrow against previous generation’s
resources, relatively poor generations end up not smoothing consumption. We then introduced
intervivos transfers and showed that by allowing a generation to decide about the timing of the
transfer to the next generation the first best solution is restored, i.e. the usual consumption
smoothing result of standard OLG models.
Compared to existing literature on intervivos transfers, we did not need to invoke heterogeneous
preferences, market frictions or uncertainty to justify the existence of intervivos transfers. More-
over, the characteristics of the equilibrium we described are exactly the same as in a standard
OLG model. Our life cycle model can, therefore, harmlessly be integrated into any extension
of a standard Overlapping Generations framework, i.e. it is fully compatible with the existing
macroeconomic literature on wealth transmission.
The empirical implication of the model is clear-cut: looking at parents and children, if the
latter face a credit constraint, the former are more likely to perform an intervivos transfer. The
analysis on Dutch data provided empirical evidence in support of the theoretical model: the
more likely it is that children become parents themselves or buy a house for the first time, the
more likely it is that their parents perform an intervivos transfer. This result was shown to be
robust to a wide range of diﬀerent specifications.
All in all, we provided theoretical and empirical support for the existence and importance of
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intervivos transfers as a transmission mechanism within the family which can alleviate wealth
inequalities between generations.
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A The basic model: no intervivos and no credit constraints
Generation t maximizes his utility Vt with respect to his choice variables c1t, c2t+1, At, bt+1:
max
c1t,c2t+1,At,bt+1
u(c1t) + u(c2t+1) + αVt+1 (23a)
subject to the following constraints.
c1t = y1t −At (23b)
c2t+1 = y2t+1 +At + bt − bt+1 (23c)
bt+1 ≥ 0 (23d)
With b1 known and given at time t = 0. From constraints (23b),(23c), c1t > 0 and c2t+1 > 0 it
follows that
At ∈ (−y2t+1 − bt, y1t)
This means individuals can borrow against future resources, including bequests. Now we have a
money transfer between generations, therefore it will be necessary to solve it starting from last
period. The transversality condition imposes bt to be optimal, we impose wlg bT = 0.
A.1 Generation T − 1
Generation T − 1 solves the following optimization problem:
max
c1T−1,c2T ,AT−1
u(c1T−1) + u(c2T ) (24a)
s.t. c1T−1 = y1T−1 −AT−1 (24b)
c2T = y2T +AT−1 + bT−1 (24c)
The received bequest bT−1 acts a an additional exogenous source of income in period 2. We can
simplify the optimization problem by substituting constraints (24b) and (24c) into the utility
function (24a) and then solving the maximization with respect to AT−1:
max
AT−1
u(y1T−1 −AT−1) + u(y2T +AT−1 + bT−1)
from which the first order condition follows:
u′(y1T−1 −AT−1) = u
′(y2T +AT−1 + bT−1)
which implies
AT−1 =
y1T−1 − y2T − bT−1
2
and
c1T−1 = c2T =
y1T−1 + y2T + bT−1
2
Generation T − 1 smooths consumption.
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A.1.1 Generation T − 2
Generation T − 2 maximization is the following:
max
c1T−2,c2T−1,bT−1,AT−2
u(c1T−2) + u(c2T−1) + αVT−1
s.t. c1T−2 = y1T−2 −AT−2
c2T−1 = y2T−1 +AT−2 + bT−2 − bT−1
bT−1 ≥ 0
Generation T − 2 anticipates that generation T − 1 will optimize his own utility: VT−1 is
generation T − 1 utility function evaluated at its maximum. Due to the terminal condition
bT = 0 generation T − 1 maximizes his utility only with respect to c1T−1, c2T , or equivalently
with respect only to AT−1. The value of AT−1 at the optimum depends on the bequest generation
T − 1 receives from generation T − 2, bT−1:
A∗T−1(bT−1) =
y1T−1 − y2T − bT−1
2
Since A∗T−1 at the optimum is determined by a choice variable of generation T −2, namely bT−1,
VT−1 is a function only of choice variables of generation T − 2. This means generation T − 2
optimization can be rewritten as a maximization with respect to AT−1 as well, replacing VT−1
and adding generation T − 1 constraints:
max
AT−2,AT−1,bT−1
u(c1T−2) + u(c2T−1) + α [u(c1T−1) + u(c2T )]
subject to the following constraints
c1T−2 = y1T−2 −AT−2
c2T−1 = y2T−1 +AT−2 + bT−2 − bT−1
bT−1 ≥ 0
c1T−1 = y1T−1 −AT−1
c2T = y2T +AT−1 + bT−1
The Lagrangian is
L = u(y1T−2 −AT−2) + u(y2T−1 +AT−2 + bT−2 − bT−1)+
+ αu(y1T−1 −AT−1) + αu(y2T +AT−1 + bT−1) + µT−1bT−1
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from which the Kuhn-Tucker conditions follow:
∂L
∂AT−2
: −u′(y1T−2 −AT−2) + u
′(y2T−1 +AT−2 + bT−2 − bT−1) = 0 (25a)
∂L
∂AT−1
: −αu′(y1T−1 −AT−1) + αu
′(y2T +AT−1 + bT−1) = 0 (25b)
∂L
∂bT−1
: −u′(y2T−1 +AT−2 + bT−2 − bT−1) + αu
′(y2T +AT−1 + bT−1) + µT−1 = 0(25c)
µT−1 ≥ 0 (25d)
bT−1 ≥ 0 (25e)
µT−1bT−1 = 0 (25f)
(25g)
CASE 1: µT−1 = 0; bT−1 ≥ 0
• FOC (25a) implies that
AT−2 =
y1T−2 + bT−1 − y2T−1 − bT−2
2
and
c1T−2 = c2T−1 =
y1T−2 + y2T−1 + bT−2 − bT−1
2
• FOC (25b) implies that
AT−1 =
y1T−1 − y2T − bT−1
2
which leads to
c1T−1 = c2T =
y1T−1 + y2T + bT−1
2
Generation T − 1 smooths his consumption as well
• From FOC (25c) it follows that
MRSc2T−1,c2T =
u′(c2T−1)
u′(c2T )
= α
The degree of altruism determines which generation consumes more.
CASE 2: µT−1 > 0; bT−1 = 0
• As for CASE 1, FOC (25a) implies that
AT−2 =
y1T−2 − y2T−1 − bT−2
2
which leads to
c1T−2 = c2T−1 =
y1T−2 + y2T−1 + bT−2
2
23
• Generation T − 1 does not receive any bequest. Therefore,
c1T−1 = c2T =
y1T−1 + y2T
2
• from FOC (34d) it holds that
u′
(
y1T−2 + y2T−1 + bT−2
2
)
= αu′
(
y1T−1 + y2T
2
)
+ µT−1
which leads to
MRSc2T−1,c2T =
u′(c2T−1)
u′(c2T )
> α
Given the concavity of the utility function u(.), this condition more likely holds if c2T−1 is
relatively low in comparison with c2T . If generation T −1 is lifetime richer than generation
T − 2, and the degree of altruism is low (low α), it is likely that bT−1 = 0. In this case
generation T−1 anticipates that he will not receive a bequest and smooth his consumption
over his lifecycle.
A.1.2 Generation T − 3
Generation T − 3 maximization is the following:
max
c1T−3,c2T−2,bT−2,AT−3
u(c1T−3) + u(c2T−2) + αVT−2
s.t. c1T−3 = y1T−3 −AT−3
c2T−2 = y2T−2 +AT−3 + bT−3 − bT−2
bT−2 ≥ 0
Generation T − 3 anticipates that generation T − 2 will optimize his own utility: VT−2 is
generation T − 2 utility function evaluatated at its maximum. Generation T − 2 maximizes his
utility with respect to c1T−1, c2T and bT−1, or equivalently with respect only to AT−2 and bT−1.
As we already noticed at the beginning of the previous section, generation T −2 sets his optimal
choice of bT−1 = b∗T−1 taking into account that the optimal saving choice of generation T − 1,
A∗T−1, is completely determined once generation T − 2 sets bT−1. Optimal saving of generation
T − 2, i.e. the value of AT−2 at the optimum, is a function of the bequest generation T − 2
receives from generation T − 3, bT−2, and of the (optimal) bequest left to generation T − 1 :
A∗T−2(bT−2, b
∗
T−1) =
y1T−2 + b∗T−1 − y2T−1 − bT−2
2
Generation T−3 anticipates T−2 will set bT−1 = b∗T−1 in such a way b
∗
T−1 maximizes generation
T − 1 as well as generation T utility, according to what we saw in previous sections.
Conditional on bT−1 = b∗T−1, AT−2 and therefore VT−2 are functions only of choice variables of
generation T −3. This means generation T −3 optimization can be rewritten as a maximization
with respect to AT−2 as well, replacing VT−2 and adding generation T − 2 constraints:
max
AT−3,AT−2,bT−2
u(c1T−3) + u(c2T−2) + α
[
u(c1T−2) + u(c2T−1) + αVT−1(b
∗
T−1)
]
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subject to the following constraints
c1T−3 = y1T−3 −AT−3
c2T−2 = y2T−2 +AT−3 + bT−3 − bT−2
bT−2 ≥ 0
c1T−2 = y1T−2 −AT−2
c∗2T−1 = y2T−1 +AT−2 + bT−2 − b
∗
T−1
As we discussed in previous section, VT−1 depends on choice variables of generation T − 2,
namely b∗T−1, but not on choice variables of generation T − 3. This does not depend on the
specific time period: At and Vt at the optimum depend on generation t choice variable bt+1 and
on choice variables of generation t−1, namely bt, but not on choice variables of generation t−2:
Vt = u(c1t) + u(c2t+1) + αVt+1(bt+1)
and
At(bt, bt+1) =
y1t − y2t+1 + bt+1 − bt
2
This means we can now solve generation T − 3 as well as all previous generations solving the
general maximization of generation t conditional upon the optimal choice of the next generation
(generation t+ 1 bequest to generation t+ 2, namely b∗t+2).
A.2 The general maximization problem: Generation t
The optimization of generation t, conditional upon the optimal choice of generation t+1 bequest
to the following generation bt+2, denoted by b∗t+2 is the following:
Vt(bt) = max
At,At+1,bt+1
u(c1t) + u(c2t+1) + α
[
u(c1t+1) + u(c2t+2) + αVt+2(b
∗
t+2)
]
subject to the following constraints
c1t = y1t −At (26a)
c2t+1 = y2t+1 +At + bt − bt+1 (26b)
c1t+1 = y1t+1 −At+1 (26c)
c∗2t+2 = y2t+2 +At+1 + bt+1 − b
∗
t+2 (26d)
bt+1 ≥ 0 (26e)
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are as follows:
∂L
∂At
: −u′(y1t −At) + u
′(y2t+1 +At + bt − bt+1) = 0 (27a)
∂L
∂At+1
: −αu′(y1t+1 −At+1) + αu
′(y2t+2 +At+1 + bt+1 − b
∗
t+2) = 0 (27b)
∂L
∂bt+1
: −u′(y2t+1 +At + bt − bt+1) + αu
′(y2t+2 +At+1 + bt+1 − b
∗
t+2) + µt+1 = 0 (27c)
µt+1 ≥ 0; bt+1 ≥ 0; µt+1bt+1 = 0 (27d)
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FOC (27a) implies that
At =
y1t + bt+1 − y2t+1 − bt
2
which leads to
c1t = c2t+1 =
y1t + y2t+1 + bt − bt+1
2
Generation t smooths his consumption. Since this result does not depend on the specific period
t, also generation t+ 1 alsways smooths consumption:
c∗1t+1 = c
∗
2t+2 =
y1t+1 + y2t+2 + bt+1 − b∗t+2
2
Now suppose generation t is willing to bequeath to generation t + 1. That is, we are at an
interior solution for bt+1, i.e. constraint (26e) is not binding, i.e. µt+1 = 0 and bt+1 ≥ 0. We
can rewrite (27c) as
MRSt,t+1 =
u′(c2t+1)
u′(c∗2t+2)
= α
Diﬀerences in the level of life–time consumption between generations depend on α.10 If genera-
tion t is not willing to bequeath to generation t+ 1 (bt+1 = 0, µt+1 > 0), then
MRSc2t+1,c∗2t+2 =
u′(y1t+y2t+bt
2
)
u′
(
y1t+1+y2t+2−b∗t+2
2
) > α
Again, consumption smoothing across generation depends on the specific value of the parameter
α and on exogenous income.11
B The model with credit constraints but no intervivos
Generation t maximizes his utility Vt with respect to his choice variables c1t, c2t+1, bt+1:
max
c1t,c2t+1,At,bt+1
u(c1t) + u(c2t+1) + αVt+1 (28a)
subject to the following constraints:
c1t = y1t −At (28b)
c2t+1 = y2t+1 +At + bt − bt+1 (28c)
At ≥ −y2t+1 (28d)
bt+1 ≥ 0 (28e)
10If α ≤ 1, from (A.2), c1t = c2t+1 > c∗1t+1 = c∗2t+2. If α > 1, from (A.2), c1t = c2t+1 < c∗1t+1 = c∗2t+2.
11If α ≥ 1 then c1t = c2t+1 ≤ c∗2t+2 = c∗1t+1. If α < 1 we can’t say anything about consumption smoothing
across generations. Given the concavity of the utility function u(.), this condition more likely holds if if c2t+1 is
relatively low in comparison with c∗2t+2. If generation t+1 is lifetime richer than generation t, and/or the degree
of altruism is low (low α), it is likely that bt+1 = 0. In this case generation t + 1 anticipates that he will not
receive a bequest and smooth his consumption over his life cycle.
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From constraints (28b),(28c), c1t > 0 and c2t+1 > 0 it follows that At ∈ (−y2t+1 − bt+1, y1t).
This is the standard assumptions about savings in OLG models: each generation can borrow up
to his whole future resources. Constraint (28d) says generation t can borrow up to his whole
second period income, but not against bequest. It follows that in our case
At ∈ [−y2t+1, y1t)
As in section A there’s a money transfer between generations, therefore it will be necessary to
solve it starting from the last period.
B.1 Generation T-1 maximization
Generation T − 1 will not bequeath any money, but he will receive at the beginning of period
T an inheritance bT−1 from generation T − 2. Therefore, generation T − 1 solves the following
optimization problem:
max
c1T−1,c2T
u(c1T−1) + u(c2T ) (29a)
s.t. c1T−1 = y1T−1 −AT−1 (29b)
c2T = y2T +AT−1 + bT−1 (29c)
AT−1 ≥ −y2T (29d)
We can simplify the optimization problem by substituting constraints (29b) and (29c) into the
utility function (29a) and then solving the maximization with respect to AT−1:
max
AT−1
u(y1T−1 −AT−1) + u(y2T +AT−1 + bT−1) (30)
s.t. AT−1 ≥ −y2T
The Lagrangian is
L = u(y1T−1 −AT−1) + u(y2T +AT−1 + bT−1) + λT−1(AT−1 + y2T )
from which the Kuhn-Tucker conditions follow:
∂L
∂AT−1
: −u′(y1T−1 −AT−1) + u
′(y2T +AT−1 + bT−1) + λT−1 = 0 (31a)
λT−1 ≥ 0 (31b)
AT−1 + y2T ≥ 0 (31c)
λT−1(AT−1 + y2T ) = 0 (31d)
CASE 1: λT−1 = 0, AT−1 > −y2T
Constraint (28d) (i.e., Kuhn-Tucker condition (31c)) is not binding. From (31a) it follows that
AT−1 =
y1T−1 − y2T − bT−1
2
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which leads to
c1T−1 = c2T =
y1T−1 + y2T + bT−1
2
(32)
Substituting (32) into (31c) it follows
y1T−1 − y2T − bT−1 ≥ −2y2T
bT−1 ≤ y1T−1 + y2T (33)
From (32) and (33): if for generation T − 1 the received bequest is not larger than lifetime
resources, then he is able to smooth consumption, i.e. the constraint (28d) in borrowing is not
binding. Note that this seems to be satisfied in most reasonable applications. Still, magnitudes
should not be taken at face value: comparisons between values of income and beqests of diﬀerent
generations lead to somewhat unrealistic, but simplified expressions due to the assumptions of
no intetemporal discounting.
CASE 2: λT−1 > 0, AT−1 = −y2T
Constraint (28d) is binding. From (31a) it follows that
y1T−1 + y2T < bT−1
and
c1T−1 = y1T−1 + y2T
c2T = bT−1
If for generation T − 1 the received bequest is larger than lifetime resources, then he does not
smooth because he cannot borrow against bequest and is forced to borrow up to the maximum
(AT−1 = −y2T ), consume all his lifetime income in period T − 1 and consume out of bequest in
period T . As we showed in section A, given the total amount of resources y1T−1 + y2T + bT−1
this consumption pattern is suboptimal since the first best would be to smooth and consume
also part of the bequest in period T − 1.
B.1.1 Generation T − 2
Generation T − 2 maximization is the following:
max
c1T−2,c2T−1,bT−1
u(c1T−2) + u(c2T−1) + αVT−1
s.t. c1T−2 = y1T−2 −AT−2
c2T−1 = y2T−1 +AT−2 + bT−2 − bT−1
AT−2 ≥ −y2T−1
bT−1 ≥ 0
Generation T − 2 anticipates that generation T − 1 will optimize his own utility: VT−1 is
generation T − 1 utility function evaluatated at its maximum. Due to the terminal condition
28
bT = 0 generation T − 1 maximizes his utility only with respect to c1T−1, c2T , or equivalently
with respct only to AT−1. The value of AT−1 at the optimum depends on the bequest generation
T − 1 receives from generation T − 2, bT−1:
AT−1(bT−1) =
{ y1T−1−y2T−bT−1
2
if bT−1 ≤ y1T−1 + y2T
−y2T if bT−1 > y1T−1 + y2T
Since AT−1 at the optimum is determined by a choice variable of generation T −2, namely bT−1,
VT−1 is a function only of choice variables of generation T − 2. This means generation T − 2
optimization can be rewritten as a maximization with respect to AT−1 as well, replacing VT−1
and adding generation T − 1 constraints:
max
AT−2,AT−1,bT−1
u(c1T−2) + u(c2T−1) + α [u(c1T−1) + u(c2T ) + αVT ]
subject to the following constraints
c1T−2 = y1T−2 −AT−2
c2T−1 = y2T−1 +AT−2 + bT−2 − bT−1
bT−1 ≥ 0
AT−2 ≥ −y2T−1
c1T−1 = y1T−1 −AT−1
c2T = y2T +AT−1 + bT−1
AT−1 ≥ −y2T
VT is equal to u(y1T ) and therefore does not depend on any choice variable of generation T − 2.
The Lagrangian is
L = u(y1T−2 −AT−2) + u(y2T−1 +AT−2 + bT−2 − bT−1)+
+ αu(y1T−1 −AT ) + αu(y2T +AT−1 + bT−1)
+ µT−1bT−1 + λT−2(AT−2 + y2T−1) + λT−1(AT−1 + y2T )
from which the Kuhn-Tucker conditions follow:
∂L
∂AT−2
: −u′(y1T−2 −AT−2) + u
′(y2T−1 +AT−2 + bT−2 − bT−1) + λT−2 = 0 (34a)
∂L
∂AT−1
: −αu′(y1T−1 −AT−1) + αu
′(y2T +AT−1 + bT−1) + λT−1 = 0 (34b)
∂L
∂bT−1
: −u′(y2T−1 +AT−2 + bT−2 − bT−1) + αu
′(y2T +AT−1 + bT−1) + µT−1 = 0(34c)
µT−1 ≥ 0, bT−1 ≥ 0, µT−1bT−1 = 0 (34d)
λT−2 ≥ 0, AT−2 + y2T−1 ≥ 0, λT−2(AT−2 + y2T−1) = 0 (34e)
λT−1 ≥ 0, AT−1 + y2T ≥ 0, λT−1(AT−1 + y2T ) = 0 (34f)
CASE 1
λT−2 = 0 λT−1 = 0 µT−1 = 0
AT−2 ≥ −y2T−1 AT−1 ≥ −y2T bT−1 ≥ 0
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• FOC (34a) implies that
AT−2 =
y1T−2 + bT−1 − y2T−1 − bT−2
2
which leads to
c1T−2 = c2T−1 =
y1T−2 + y2T−1 + bT−2 − bT−1
2
Moreover,
bT−2 ≤ y1T−2 + y2T−1 + bT−1
Generation T − 2 smooths his consumption if the received bequest bT−2 is not larger than
his lifetime income plus what wants to transfer to generation T − 1.
• FOC (34b) implies that
AT−1 =
y1T−1 − y2T − bT−1
2
which leads to
c1T−1 = c2T =
y1T−1 + y2T + bT−1
2
Moreover,
AT−1 =
y1T−1 − y2T − bT−1
2
≥ −y2T ⇒ bT−1 ≤ y1T−1 + y2T
Generation T − 1 smooths his consumption if the received bequest bT−1 is not larger than
his lifetime income.
• From FOC (34d)
u′
(
y1T−2 + y2T−1 + bT−2 − bT−1
2
)
= αu′
(
y1T−1 + y2T + bT−1
2
)
(35)
which can be rewritten as
MRSc2T−1,c2T =
u′(c2T−1)
u′(c2T )
= α
The degree of altruism determines which generation consumes more.12
12If α < 1 ⇒ c1T−2 = c2T−1 > c1T−1 = c2T . This means that generation T − 2 consumption level is higher
than generation T − 1 consumption level despite the bequest bT−1 which generation T − 2 to generation T − 1.
If α ≥ 1⇒ c1T−2 = c2T−1 ≤ c1T−1 = c2T . When does it happen?
y1T−2 + y2T−1 + bT−2 − bT−1
2
<
y1T−1 + y2T + bT−1
2
or
bT−1 > (y1T−2 + y2T−1 + bT−2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
lifetime resources gen T−2
− (y1T−1 + y2T + bT−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
lifetime resources gen T−1
Now, using condition (35) this can be rewritten as
y1T−2 + y2T−1 + bT−2 ≤ 3(y1T−1 + y2T )
Consumption of gen T − 1 is higher than consumption of gen T − 2 only if α > 1 and generation T − 2 is not
much richer than generation T − 1.
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CASE 2
λT−2 = 0 λT−1 > 0 µT−1 = 0
AT−2 ≥ −y2T−1 AT−1 = −y2T bT−1 ≥ 0
• As for CASE 1, FOC (34a) implies that
AT−2 =
y1T−2 − y2T−1 − bT−2 + bT−1
2
which leads to
c1T−2 = c2T−1 =
y1T−2 + y2T−1 + bT−2 − bT−1
2
Moreover, generation T − 2 smooth his consumption if the received bequest bT−2 is no
larger than his lifetime income plus what wants to transfer to generation T − 1, i.e.
bT−2 ≤ y1T−2 + y2T−1 + bT−1
• Since AT−1 = −y2T it follows that
c1T−1 = y1T−1 + y2T ; c2T = bT−1
Moreover, since λT−1 > 0 from FOC (34b)
y1T−1 + y2T < bT−1
i.e., generation T−1 does not smooth since received bequest is larger than lifetime income,
and he cannot borrow against bequest hitting the credit limit constraint.
• From FOC (34d)
MRSc2T−1,c2T =
u′(c2T−1)
u′(c2T )
= α (36)
and the degree of altruism determines which generation consumes more exactly as in CASE
1.13
13From equation (36), u′
(
y1T−2+y2T−1+bT−2−bT−1
2
)
= αu′ (bT−1). If α < 1
u′
(
y1T−2 + y2T−1 + bT−2 − bT−1
2
)
< u′(bT−1)⇔
y1T−2 + y2T−1 + bT−2 − bT−1
2
> bT−1 ⇔
bT−1 <
1
3
(y1T−2 + y2T−1 + bT−2)
Now using the liquidity constraint condition we get
3(y1T−1 + y2T ) < y1T−2 + y2T−1 + bT−2
If generation T − 2 is much more lifetime richer than generation T − 1, generation T − 2 smooths and generation
T − 1 doesn’t even if altruism is low. If α ≥ 1 then
bT−1 ≥ 1
3
(y1T−2 + y2T−1 + bT−2)
If altruism is high (α ≥ 1) it is enough that gen T − 2 bequeaths at least a third of his lifetime resources to have
gen T − 1 not smoothing. If you consider real estate wealth, this is not necessarily a big amount.
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CASE 3
λT−2 = 0 λT−1 = 0 µT−1 > 0
AT−2 ≥ −y2T−1 AT−1 ≥ −y2T bT−1 = 0
• As for CASE 1, FOC (34a) implies that
AT−2 =
y1T−2 − y2T−1 − bT−2
2
which leads to
c1T−2 = c2T−1 =
y1T−2 + y2T−1 + bT−2
2
Moreover, generation T − 2 smooth his consumption if the received bequest bT−2 is no
larger than his lifetime income plus what wants to transfer to generation T − 1, i.e.
bT−2 ≤ y1T−2 + y2T−1 + bT−1
• again, from FOC (34b)
AT−1 =
y1T−1 − y2T
2
which leads to
c1T−1 = c2T =
y1T−1 + y2T
2
Moreover,
AT−1 =
y1T−1 − y2T
2
≥ −y2T ⇔ y1T−1 + y2T ≥ 0
Condition (B.1.1) is always satisfied since ∀i, t, yit ≥ 0.
• from FOC (34d) it holds that
u′(
y1T−2 + y2T−1 + bT−2
2
) = αu′
(
y1T−1 + y2T
2
)
+ µT−1
which leads to
MRSc2T−1,c2T =
u′(c2T−1)
u′(c2T )
> α
Given the concavity of the utility function u(.), this condition more likely holds if c2T−1 is
relatively low in comparison with c2T . If generation T −1 is lifetime richer than generation
T − 2, and the degree of altruism is low (low α), it is likely that bT−1 = 0. In this case
generation T−1 anticipates that he will not receive a bequest and smooth his consumption
over his lifecycle.
CASE 4
λT−2 = 0 λT−1 > 0 µT−1 > 0
AT−2 ≥ −y2T−1 AT−1 = −y2T bT−1 = 0
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This is not an admissable case. FOC (34b) and λT−1 > imply that
bT−1 > y1T−1 + y2T > 0 (37)
At the same, it should hold that µT−1 > 0 and bT−1 = 0 which contradicts (37): If bT−1 = 0
then generation T − 1 smooths consumption.
CASE 5
λT−2 > 0 λT−1 = 0 µT−1 = 0
AT−2 = −y2T−1 AT−1 ≥ −y2T bT−1 ≥ 0
• Since AT−2 = −y2T−1 it follows that
c1T−2 = y1T−2 + y2T−1; c
∗
2T = bT−2 − bT−1
Moreover, since λT−2 > 0 from FOC (34a)
y1T−2 + y2T−1 < bT−2 − bT−1
Generation T −2 cannot smooth his consumption since the received bequest bT−2 is larger
than his lifetime income plus what wants to transfer to generation T − 1 and therefore he
hits the credit constraint.
• From FOC (34b)
AT−1 =
y1T−1 − y2T − bT−1
2
which leads to
c1T−1 = c2T =
y1T−1 + y2T + bT−1
2
Moreover, since AT−1 ≥ −y2T , it follows
bT−1 ≤ y1T−1 + y2T
• From FOC (34d)
MRSc2T−1,c2T =
u′(c2T−1)
u′(c2T )
= α (38)
and the degree of altruism determines which generation consumes more exactly as in CASE
1.14
14Replacing optimal second period consumption for both generations in (38), it follows that
u′(bT−2 − bT−1) = αu′
(
y1T−1 + y2T + bT−1
2
)
If α < 1 (low altruism), u′(bT−2 − bT−1) < u′
(
y1T−1+y2T+bT−1
2
)
, which implies
c2T−1 = bT−2 − bT−1 < y1T−1 + y2T + bT−1
2
= c∗1T−1 = c2T
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CASE 6
λT−2 > 0 λT−1 > 0 µT−1 = 0
AT−2 = −y2T−1 AT−1 = −y2T bT−1 ≥ 0
• As in CASE 5, from AT−2 = −y2T−1 it follows that
c1T−2 = y1T−2 + y2T−1; c
∗
2T = bT−2 − bT−1
Moreover, since λT−2 > 0 from FOC (34a)
bT−2 > y1T−2 + y2T−1 + bT−1 (39)
Generation T −2 cannot smooth his consumption since the received bequest bT−2 is larger
than his lifetime income plus what wants to transfer to generation T − 1 and therefore he
hits the credit constraint.
• Since AT−1 = −y2T it follows that
c1T−1 = y1T−1 + y2T ; c2T = bT−1
Moreover, since λT−1 > 0 from FOC (34b)
y1T−1 + y2T < bT−1 (40)
i.e., generation T−1 does not smooth since received bequest is larger than lifetime income,
and he cannot borrow against bequest hitting the credit limit constraint.
• From FOC (34d)
MRSc2T−1,c2T =
u′(c2T−1)
u′(c2T )
= α (41)
and the degree of altruism determines which generation consumes more exactly as in CASE
1.15
Generation T − 2 consumes more than generation T − 1 at least in period 2 (remember that due to the binding
credit constraint c1T−2 < c2T−1). If α ≥ 1 then bT−2 − bT−1 ≤ y1T−1+y2T+bT−12 , which implies
c1T−2 < c2T−1 = bT−2 − bT−1 ≤ y1T−1 + y2T + bT−1
2
= c1T−1 = c2T
If altruism is high, generation T − 2 consumption is always below generation T − 1 consumption.
15Replacing optimal consumption for both generations in (41), it follows that u′(bT−2 − bT−1) = αu′(bT−1). If
α < 1, then bT−2 − bT−1 > bT−1, which implies c2T−1 < c1T−1. Given equation (40) it also holds that
bT−2 > 2(y1T−1 + y2T )
Again if generation T − 2 is much lifetime richer than generation T − 1, the latter receives a large bequest that
does not allow to smooth consumption, even with low altruism. In this case this is due to a very large bequest
bT−2 so that generation T − 2 also doesn’t smooth consumption over his lifecycle.
If α ≥ 1 ⇒ bT−2 − bT−1 ≤ bT−1. Given equation (39) it holds that bT−1 > y1T−2 + y2T−1. So, if altruism
is high AND generation T − 2 is not smoothing, bT−1 is bigger that total lifetime earnings of generation T − 2.
Moreover, bT−2 received by generation T − 2 was huge. Again, magnitudes are somewhat unrealistic due to the
simplifying assumption of no intertemporal discounting.
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CASE 7
λT−2 > 0 λT−1 = 0 µT−1 > 0
AT−2 = −y2T−1 AT−1 ≥ −y2T bT−1 = 0
• Since AT−2 = −y2T−1 it follows that
c1T−2 = y1T−2 + y2T−1; c2T = bT−2
Moreover, since λT−2 > 0 from FOC (34a)
y1T−2 + y2T−1 < bT−2
Generation T −2 cannot smooth his consumption since the received bequest bT−2 is larger
than his lifetime income (he does not want to transfer anything to the next generation),
and therefore he hits the credit constraint
• From FOC (34b)
AT−1 =
y1T−1 − y2T
2
which leads to
c1T−1 = c2T =
y1T−1 + y2T
2
Moreover,
AT−1 =
y1T−1 − y2T
2
≥ −y2T ⇔ y1T−1 + y2T ≥ 0
which is always satisfied since ∀i, t, yit ≥ 0.
• From the FOC (34a) and (34c) it follows that
u′(y1T−2 + y2T−1) = u
′(bT−2) + λT−2 (42)
u′(bT−2) = αu
′(
y1T−1 + y2T
2
) + µT−1 (43)
Generation T − 1 is smoothing. Substitution of equation (43) into (42)
u′(y1T−2 + y2T−1) = αu
′(
y1T−1 + y2T
2
) + µT−1 + λT−2 ⇒
MRSc2T−1,c2T =
u′(y1T−2 + y2T−1)
u′(y1T−1+y2T
2
)
> α
This scenario is more likely if lifetime earnings of generation T−2 is relatively low compared
with lifetime earnings of generation T − 1 and/or the degree of altruism is low.
CASE 8
λT−2 > 0 λT−1 > 0 µT−1 > 0
AT−2 = −y2T−1 AT−1 = −y2T bT−1 = 0
This case is not admissable for reasons mentioned under CASE 4 (see above).
ALL IN ALL
Regardless of whether generation T − 2 smooths or not,
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• if bT−1 = 0 then generation T − 1 smooths consumption;
• generation T − 1 is more likely to be liquidity constrained and not able to smooth if
generation T − 2 is (much) lifetime richer than generation T − 1, regardless on whether
these resources come from earnings or bequest from generation T − 3.
B.1.2 Generation T − 3
Generation T − 3 maximization is the following:
max
c1T−3,c2T−2,bT−2
u(c1T−3) + u(c2T−2) + αVT−2
s.t. c1T−3 = y1T−3 −AT−3
c2T−2 = y2T−2 +AT−3 + bT−3 − bT−2
AT−3 ≥ −y2T−2
Generation T − 3 anticipates that generation T − 2 will optimize his own utility: VT−2 is
generation T − 2 utility function evaluatated at its maximum. Generation T − 2 maximizes
his utility with respect to c1T−1, c2T and bT−1, or equivalently with respect only to AT−2 and
bT−1. As we already noticed at the beginnning of the previous section, generation T − 2 sets his
optimal choice of bT−1 = b∗T−1 taking into account that the optimal saving choice of generation
T − 1, A∗T−1, is completely determined once generation T − 2 sets bT−1.
Optimal saving of generation T − 2, i.e. the value of AT−2 at the optimum, depends on the
bequest generation T − 2 receives from generation T − 3, bT−2, and on the (optimal) bequest
left to generation T − 1 :
A∗T−2(bT−2, b
∗
T−1) =
{
y1T−2+b
∗
T−1−y2T−1−bT−2
2
if bT−2 ≤ y1T−2 + y2T−1 + b∗T−1
−y2T−1 if bT−2 > y1T−2 + y2T−1 + b∗T−1
Generation T − 3 anticipates T − 2 will set bT−1 = b∗T−1 according to what we saw in previous
section.
Conditional on bT−1 = b∗T−1, AT−2 and therefore VT−2 are functions only of choice variables of
generation T −3. This means generation T −3 optimization can be rewritten as a maximization
with respect to AT−2 as well, replacing VT−2 and adding generation T − 2 constraints:
max
AT−3,AT−2,bT−2
u(c1T−3) + u(c2T−2) + α
[
u(c1T−2) + u(c2T−1) + αVT−1(b
∗
T−1)
]
subject to the following constraints
c1T−3 = y1T−3 −AT−3
c2T−2 = y2T−2 +AT−3 + bT−3 − bT−2
bT−2 ≥ 0
AT−3 ≥ −y2T−2
c1T−2 = y1T−2 −AT−2
c2T−1 = y2T−1 +AT−2 + bT−2 − b
∗
T−1
AT−2 ≥ −y2T−1
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As we discussed in previous section, VT−1 does depend on choice variables of generation T − 2,
namely bT−1, but not on choice variables of generation T − 3. This does not depend on the
specific time period: the specific values of At and Vt at the optimum depend on generation t
choice variable bt+1 and on choice variables of generation t − 1, namely bt, but not on choice
variables of generation t− 2:
Vt = u(c
∗
1t) + u(c
∗
2t+1) + αVt+1(b
∗
t+1)
and
A∗t (bt, b
∗
t+1) =
{ y1t+b∗t+1−y2t+1−bt
2
if bt ≤ y1t + y2t+1 + b∗t+1
−y2t+1 if bt > y1t + y2t+1 + b∗t+1
This means we can now solve generation T − 3 as well as all previous generations solving the
general maximization of generation t conditional upon the optimal choice of the next generation
(generation t+ 1 bequest to generation t+ 2, namely b∗t+2).
B.2 The general maximization problem: Generation t
The optimization of generation t, conditional upon the optimal choice of generation t+1 bequest
to the following generation bt+2, denoted by b∗t+2 is the following:
Vt(bt) = max
At,At+1,bt+1
u(c1t) + u(c2t+1) + α
[
u(c1t+1) + u(c2t+2) + αVt+2(b
∗
t+2)
]
(45a)
subject to the following constraints
c1t = y1t −At (45b)
c2t+1 = y2t+1 +At + bt − bt+1 (45c)
c1t+1 = y1t+1 −At+1 (45d)
c2t+2 = y2t+2 +At+1 + bt+1 − b
∗
t+2 (45e)
bt+1 ≥ 0 (45f)
Aτ ≥ −y2τ+1, τ = t, t+ 1 (45g)
The Lagrangian is
L = u(y1t −At) + u(y2t+1 +At + bt − bt+1)
+ α
[
u(y1t+1 −At+1) + u(y2t+2 +At+1 + bt+1 − b
∗
t+2) + αVt+2(b
∗
t+2)
]
+ µt+1(bt+1) + λt(At + y2t+1) + λt+1(At+1 + y2t+2)
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from which the Kuhn-Tucker conditions follow:
∂L
∂At
: −u′(y1t −At) + u
′(y2t+1 +At + bt − bt+1) + λt = 0 (46a)
∂L
∂At+1
: −αu′(y1t+1 −At+1) + αu
′(y2t+2 +At+1 + bt+1 − b
∗
t+2) + λt+1 = 0 (46b)
∂L
∂bt+1
: −u′(y2t+1 +At + bt − bt+1) + αu
′(y2t+2 +At+1 + bt+1 − b
∗
t+2) + µt+1 = 0 (46c)
µt+1 ≥ 0 (46d)
bt+1 ≥ 0 (46e)
µt+1bt+1 = 0 (46f)
λτ ≥ 0, τ = t, t+ 1 (46g)
At + y2t+1 ≥ 0 (46h)
At+1 + y2t+2 ≥ 0 (46i)
λτ (Aτ + y2τ ) = 0, τ = t, t+ 1 (46j)
If generation t is not liquidity constrained in period t, i.e constraint (45g) is not binding for
period t and λt = 0, FOC (46a) implies that
At =
y1t + bt+1 − y2t+1 − bt
2
(47)
which leads to
c1t = c2t+1 =
y1t + y2t+1 + bt − bt+1
2
(48)
Moreover, since
At =
y1t+1 + bt+1 − y2t+1 − bt
2
≥ −y2t+1 (49)
it follows that generation t smooth his consumption if the bequest received bt is not larger than
his lifetime income plus what he want to leave to the next generation, i.e.
bt ≤ y1t + y2t+1 + bt+1
If also generation t+ 1 is not liquidity constrained (λt+1 = 0),
c∗1t+1 = c
∗
2t+2 =
y1t+1 + y2t+2 + bt+1 − b∗t+2
2
Vice versa, if generation t+ 1 is liquidity constrained (λt+1 > 0),
c∗1t+1 = y1t+1 + y2t+2 < c
∗
2t+2 = bt+1 − b
∗
t+2
Now suppose generation t is willing to bequeath to generation t + 1. That is, we are at an
interior solution for bt+1, i.e. constraint (45f) is not binding, i.e. µt+1 = 0 and bt+1 ≥ 0. We can
rewrite (46c) as
MRSt,t+1 =
u′(c2t+1)
u′(c∗2t+2)
= α (50)
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Cross-generation diﬀerences in the level of life–time consumption depend on α and on exogenous
income.16 If generation t is not liquidity constrained (λt = 0) and is not willing to bequeath to
generation t+ 1 (bt+1 = 0, µt+1 > 0), then generation t+ 1 is not liquidity constrained as well
(i.e. bt+1 = 0 ≤ y1t+1 + y2t+2 + b∗t+2). Then it holds that
u′(
y1t + y2t+1 + bt
2
) = αu′
(
y1t+1 + y2t+2 − b∗t+2
2
)
+ µt+1 ⇒
MRSc2t+1,c∗2t+2 =
u′(y1t+y2t+bt
2
)
u′
(
y1t+1+y2t+2−b∗t+2
2
) > α
Again, consumption smoothing across generation depends on the specific value of the parameter
α and on exogenous income.17
If generation t is liquidity constrained and consequently does not smooth consumption, i.e.
λt > 0 and At = −y2t+1. Then c∗1t = y1t + y2t+1 < c
∗
2t+1 = bt − bt+1 and from Kuhn-Tucker
condition (46a) it follows that
u′(y1t + y2t+1) > u
′(bt − bt+1)⇔ y1t + y2t+1 < bt − bt+1
or
bt > y1t + y2t+1 + bt+1 (51)
At an internal solution on bequests, i.e. µt+1 = 0 from (46a) and (46c) we get again
MRSc2t+1,c∗2t+2 =
u′(c2t+1)
u′
(
c∗2t+2
) = α
and comparative statics on consumption smoothing across generations can be easily obtained.18
If generation t is liquidity constrained and not willing to bequeath, i.e.
λt > 0⇒ At = −y2T−1
16If bt ≤ y1t + y2t+1 + bt+1 and bt+1 ≤ y1t+1 + y2t+2 + b∗t+2 (gen t and t+ 1 not liq constrained)
1. If α < 1, from (50), c1t = c2t+1 > c
∗
1t+1 = c
∗
2t+2
2. If α = 1, from (50), c1t = c2t+1 = c
∗
1t+1 = c
∗
2t+2
3. If α > 1, from (50), c1t = c2t+1 < c
∗
1t+1 = c
∗
2t+2
If bt ≤ y1t + y2t+1 + bt+1 and bt+1 > y1t+1 + y2t+2 + b∗t+2 (gen t+ 1 not smoothing)
1. If α < 1, from (50), c1t = c2t+1 > c
∗
1t+1 > c
∗
2t+2
2. If α = 1, from (50), c1t = c2t+1 = c
∗
2t+2 > c
∗
1t+1
3. If α > 1, from (50), c1t = c2t+1 < c
∗
2t+2 Here we cannot say much on the diﬀerence between c
∗
1t+1 and c2t+1
17If α ≥ 1 then c1t = c2t+1 ≤ c∗2t+2 = c∗1t+1. If α < 1 we can’t say anything about consumption smoothing
across generations. Given the concavity of the utility function u(.), this condition more likely holds if if c2t+1 is
relatively low in comparison with c∗2t+2. If generation t+1 is lifetime richer than generation t, and/or the degree
of altruism is low (low α), it is likely that bt+1 = 0. In this case generation t + 1 anticipates that he will not
receive a bequest and smooth his consumption over his life cycle.
18If bt > y1t + y2t+1 + bt+1 and bt+1 ≤ y1t+1 + y2t+2 + b∗t+2 (gen. t+ 1 not liq constrained)
1. If α < 1, c1t < c2t+1 and c2t+1 > c
∗
2t+2 = c
∗
1t+1
2. If α = 1, c1t < c2t+1 = c
∗
1t+1 = c
∗
2t+2
39
µt+1 > 0⇒ bt+1 = 0
From the FOC (46a) and (46c) it follows that c1t = y1t + y2t+1, c2t+1 = bt, c2t+1 > c1t and
generation t + 1 always smooths. As regards intergenerational consumption smoothing, we
obtain again
MRSc2t+1,c∗2t+2 =
u′(bt)
u′
(
y1t+1+y2t+2−b∗t+2
2
) > α
from which it is easy to compute comparative statics.19
GENERAL COMMENTS ON GENERATION t SOLUTION
If individuals cannot borrow against bequests, solutions may change compared to the standard
case:
1. For any level of altruism α, it is possible to observe solutions in which some generations
hit their liquidity constraint and do not smooth consumption.
2. This happens if bt > y1t + y2t+1 + bt+1. That is if received bequests from previous genera-
tions is larger than lifetime earnings plus what generation t wants to transfer to the next
generation t+ 1.
3. Since the within period utility functions are the same across generations given resources,
the marginal propensities to consume is the same across generations.
4. The same for altruism
5. This means that it is enough to have heterogeneity in income across generations to observe
people hitting the liquidity constraint. No need for heterogenous preferences.
6. Whatever shocks to generation t permanent income, even expected which brings down
generation t resources with respect to the previous generation, lead to a suboptimal solution
for generation t: generation t would like to smooth but cannot consume out of bequests
in their first period.
3. If α > 1, c1t < c2t+1 < c∗1t+1 = c
∗
2t+2
If bt > y1t + y2t+1 + bt+1 and bt+1 > y1t+1 + y2t+2 + b
∗
t+2 (both generations liquidity constrained liq constrained)
1. If α < 1, c1t < c2t+1 and c2t+1 > c∗2t+2 > c
∗
1t+1
2. If α = 1, c1t < c2t+1 = c
∗
2t+2
3. If α > 1, c1t < c2t+1 < c
∗
2t+2
19If α ≥ 1, c1t < c2t+1 < c∗2t+2 = c∗1t+1. If α < 1, nothing can be said on smoothing across generations. This
scenario is more likely if lifetime earnings of generation t is relatively low compared with lifetime earnings of
generation t+ 1 and/or the degree of altruism is low.
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C The full model with bequests and intervivos transfers
Suppose now that generation t now also receives an intervivos transfer Rt−1 at the beginning of
period t from the previous generation and can give an intervivos transfer the the next generation
t+ 1 at the end of period t (Rt).
max
c1t,c2t+1,Rt,bt+1
u(c1t) + u(c2t+1) + αVt+1 (52a)
subject to the following constraints
c1t = y1t −At +Rt−1 −Rt (52b)
c2t+1 = y2t+1 +At + bt − bt+1 (52c)
bt+1 ≥ 0 (52d)
Rt ≥ 0 (52e)
At ≥ −y2t+1 (52f)
With b1, R0 known and given at time t = 0. From constraint (52b),(52c), c1t > 0 and c2t+1 > 0
it follows that At ∈ (−y2t+1 − bt + bt+1, y1t + Rt−1 − Rt). A generation which does not want
to transfer any money, can save or borrow within At ∈ (−y2t+1 − bt, y1t + Rt−1). This is the
standard assumptions about savings in OLG models: each generation can borrow up to his
whole future resources. Constraint (52f) says generation t can borrow up to his whole second
period income, but not against bequest. It follows that in our case, if bt > bt+1
At ∈ [−y2t+1, y1t +Rt−1 −Rt)
As in sections B and A there are money transfers between generations (two in this case, intervivos
and bequests), therefore it will be necessary to solve it starting from the last period. Generation
T consumes all his income and the money received from previous generation as an inter-vivos
c∗1T = y1T +RT−1; VT = u(y1T +RT−1).
C.1 Generation T − 1
Generation T − 1 leave an inter-vivos transfer but not a bequest, due to the terminal conditions
bT = 0 and RT−1 = 0. The optimization problem is the following:
max
c1T−1,c2T ,AT−1
u(c1T−1) + u(c2T )
s.t. c1T−1 = y1T−1 −AT−1 +RT−2
c2T = y2T +AT−1 + bT−1
AT−1 ≥ −y2T
So the Lagrangian becomes
L = u(y1T−1 −AT−1 +RT−2) + u(y2T +AT−1 + bT−1) + λT−1(AT−1 + y2T )
41
FOC
∂L
∂AT−1
: −u′(y1T−1 −AT−1 +RT−2) + u
′(y2T +AT−1 + bT−1) + λT−1 = 0 (53)
We can distinguish two cases:
1. λT−1 = 0; AT−1 + y2T ≥ 0 (liquidity constraint not binding)
From FOC (53): Generation T − 1 smooths his consumption
c∗1T−1 = c
∗
2T =
y1T−1 +RT−2 + y2T + bT−1
2
bT−1 −RT−2 ≤ y1T−1 + y2T
2. λT−1 > 0; AT−1 = −y2T (liquidity constraint binding)
From FOC (53): No consumption smoothing
c∗1T−1 = y1T−1 + y2T +RT−2; c
∗
2T = bT−1
Moreover,
bT−1 −RT−2 > y1T−1 + y2T
C.2 Generation t
max
c1t,c2t+1,Rt,bt+1
u(c1t) + u(c2t+1) + αVt+1
subject to the following constraints
c1t = y1t −At +Rt−1 −Rt
c2t+1 = y2t+1 +At + bt − bt+1
bt+1 ≥ 0
Rt ≥ 0
At ≥ −y2t
We can rewrite generation t maximization conditional on generation t+ 1 choice variables eval-
uated at their optimum, namely R∗t+1 and b
∗
t+2, including generation t + 1 saving At+1 among
the choice variables of generation t, as well as all the relevant constraints in the maximization
problem.
Vt(Rt−1, bt) = max
At,At+1,Rt,bt+1
u(c1t) + u(c2t+1) + α
[
u(c1t+1) + u(c2t+2) + αVt+2(R
∗
t+1, b
∗
t+2)
]
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subject to the following constraints
c1t = y1t −At +Rt−1 −Rt
c2t+1 = y2t+1 +At + bt − bt+1
c1t+1 = y1t+1 −At+1 +Rt −R
∗
t+1
c2t+2 = y2t+2 +At+1 + bt+1 − b
∗
t+2
bt+1 ≥ 0
Rt ≥ 0
Aτ ≥ −y2τ+1, τ = t, t+ 1
The Lagrangian is
L = u(y1t −At +Rt−1 −Rt) + u(y2t+1 +At + bt − bt+1)
+ α
[
u(y1t+1 −At+1 +Rt −R
∗
t+1) + u(y2t+2 +At+1 + bt+1 − b
∗
t+2) + αVt+2(R
∗
t+1, b
∗
t+2)
]
+ µt+1(bt+1) + νt(Rt) + λt(At + y2t+1) + λt+1(At+1 + y2t+2)
from which the Kuhn-Tucker conditions follow:
∂L
∂At
: −u′(y1t −At +Rt−1 −Rt) + u
′(y2t+1 +At + bt − bt+1) + λt = 0 (54a)
∂L
∂At+1
: −αu′(y1t+1 −At+1 +Rt −R
∗
t+1) + αu
′(y2t+2 +At+1 + bt+1 − b
∗
t+2) + λt+1 = 0 (54b)
∂L
∂bt+1
: −u′(y2t+1 +At + bt − bt+1) + αu
′(y2t+2 +At+1 + bt+1 − b
∗
t+2) + µt+1 = 0 (54c)
∂L
∂Rt
: −u′(y1t −At +Rt−1 −Rt) + αu
′(y1t+1 −At+1 +Rt −R
∗
t+1) + νt = 0 (54d)
µt+1 ≥ 0 (54e)
bt+1 ≥ 0 (54f)
µt+1bt+1 = 0 (54g)
νt ≥ 0 (54h)
Rt ≥ 0 (54i)
νtRt = 0 (54j)
λτ ≥ 0, τ = t, t+ 1 (54k)
At + y2t+1 ≥ 0 (54l)
At+1 + y2t+2 ≥ 0 (54m)
λτ (Aτ + y2τ ) = 0, τ = t, t+ 1 (54n)
If b1 and R0, which are known at time t = 0, are such that R0 ≥ b1 = 0, by the Theorem proved
in main body of the article, the only admissible cases are the following
1. c1t = c2t+1; c∗1t+1 = c
∗
2t+2; bt+1 > 0; Rt > 0
2. c1t = c2t+1; c∗1t+1 = c
∗
2t+2; bt+1 = 0; Rt = 0
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CASE 1 λt = λt+1 = µt+1 = νt = 0: (liquidity constraints not binding (consumption smooth-
ing); positive intervivos and bequests)
From (54a): Generation t smooths his consumption
c1t = c2t+1 =
y1t +Rt−1 −Rt + y2t+1 + bt − bt+1
2
and
At =
y1t +Rt−1 −Rt − y2t+1 − bt + bt+1
2
Since At ≥ −y2t+1
bt −Rt−1 ≤ y1t + y2t+1 −Rt + bt+1
bt − Rt−1 denotes the ’excess’ transfer received by gen. t in his second period of life wrt
first period.
bt+1 −Rt denotes the ’excess’ transfer given by gen. t in his second period of life wrt first
period.
Nothing changes in comparison the model without intervivos transfers as long as we look
at the optimization problem in terms of bt+1 − Rt which is ’equivalent’ to bt+1 in model
without intervivos.
From (54b)
c∗1t+1 = c
∗
2t+2 =
y1t+1 +Rt −R∗t+1 + y2t+2 + bt+1 − b
∗
t+2
2
and
A∗t+1 =
y1t+1 +Rt −R∗t+1 − y2t+1 − bt+1 + b
∗
t+2
2
Since A∗t+1 > −y2t+2
bt+1 −Rt ≤ y1t+1 + y2t+2 + b
∗
t+2 −R
∗
t+1
From FOC (54c) and (54d):
u′(c2t+1)
u′(c∗2t+2)
=
u′(c1t)
u′(c∗1t+1)
= α
Consumption smoothing across generations, i.e. whether generation t or generation t+ 1
per-period consumption is higher depends on whether α ! 0.
CASE 2 λt = λt+1 = 0; µt+1 > 0; νt > 0: (liq constraint not binding for gen t + 1 and t,
bt+1 = 0, Rt = 0)
Again,
c1t = c2t+1
c∗1t+1 = c
∗
2t+2
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Together with FOC (54c) and (54d), the equations above imply the following
u′(c2t+1)
u′(c∗2t+2)
=
u′(c1t)
u′(c∗1t+1)
> α
This is an admissable solution. If α > 1, consumption of generation t + 1 is higher than
that of t.
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Table 1: The structure of the model
time t time t+ 1 time t+ 2 ...
beginning end beginning end beginning end
Generation t money IN y1t, Rt−1 At, y2t+1, bt
money OUT c1t At, Rt c2t+1 bt+1
Generation t+ 1 money IN y1t+1, Rt At+1, y2t+2,bt+1
money OUT c1t+1 At+1, , Rt+1 c2t+2 bt+2
...
. . . time T − 2 time T − 1 time T
beginning end beginning end beginning end
...
Generation T − 2 money IN y1T−2, RT−3 AT−2,bT−2, y2T−1
money OUT c1T−2 AT−2, RT−2 c2T−1 bT−1
Generation T − 1 money IN y1T−1, RT−2 AT−1,bT−1,y2T
money OUT c1T−1 AT−1, RT−1 = 0 c2T bT = 0
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Table 2: Baseline: Linear probability model
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES FE FE FE
prob child has first child OR buys house 0.403* 0.505** 0.504**
(0.231) (0.242) (0.241)
number of children 0.091** 0.092**
(0.045) (0.045)
number of children squared -0.015** -0.015***
(0.006) (0.006)
how many grandchildren 0.006 0.006
(0.004) (0.004)
partner present in the household -0.051 -0.048
(0.079) (0.079)
age of the oldest child -0.004 -0.003
(0.005) (0.005)
poorhealth 0.036*
(0.019)
IHS total earnings 0.002
(0.002)
IHS net financial wealth -0.001
(0.002)
IHS net real wealth 0.001
(0.001)
employed or self employed -0.014
(0.028)
unemployed and looking for work -0.089**
(0.044)
save to cover unforeseen expenses 0.001
(0.006)
Observations 5,053 5,053 5,053
Number of personid 1,465 1,465 1,465
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors clustered at household level reported in parenthesis.
All specifications include a full set of year dummies and a quadratic term in age to account for non linear age
eﬀects (De Ree and Alessie, 2011). ’IHS’ stands for Inverse Hyperbolic Sine’ transformation. Columns (2) and
(3) include also a full set of regional dummies.
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Table 3: Alternative estimation methods: RE and probit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES RE mundlak re probit cor re probit
prob child has first child OR buys house 0.307** 0.503** 0.245* 0.378*
(0.144) (0.241) (0.131) (0.205)
number of children 0.041* 0.093** 0.043 0.102**
(0.024) (0.045) (0.028) (0.051)
number of children squared -0.009** -0.015*** -0.009** -0.016**
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007)
how many grandchildren 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
partner present in the household 0.021 -0.047 0.014 -0.049
(0.035) (0.079) (0.034) (0.069)
age of the oldest child -0.006*** -0.003 -0.006*** -0.003
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005)
poorhealth 0.018 0.036* 0.017 0.030*
(0.016) (0.019) (0.015) (0.018)
IHS total earnings 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
IHS net financial wealth 0.003** -0.001 0.004** -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
IHS net real wealth 0.003** 0.001 0.004** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
employed or self employed -0.007 -0.014 -0.005 -0.017
(0.019) (0.028) (0.019) (0.028)
unemployed and looking for work -0.079** -0.087** -0.107* -0.127**
(0.037) (0.044) (0.055) (0.059)
save to cover unforeseen expenses -0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.000
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
college education 0.033 0.025 0.029 0.023
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
Low or no education -0.043 -0.039 -0.049 -0.045
(0.032) (0.032) (0.036) (0.035)
female -0.032* -0.028 -0.035** -0.032*
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
Observations 5,053 5,053 5,053 5,053
Number of personid 1,465 1,465 1,465 1,465
Significance mundlak terms (p–val) 0.0001 0.0003
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors clustered at household level reported in parenthesis.
Table reports marginal eﬀects at the mean. All specifications include a full set of year dummies, a set of regional
dummies and a quadratic polynomial in age. ’IHS’ stands for Inverse Hyperbolic Sine’ transformation.
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Table 4: Alternative specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES curr transf subst transf interacted One obs/hh full panel
prob child has first child OR buys house 0.517** 0.395** 0.299 0.483* 0.519***
(0.206) (0.186) (0.264) (0.285) (0.130)
IHSnfinw*haz union 0.022*
(0.012)
number of children 0.029 0.024 0.087** 0.146*** 0.042*
(0.030) (0.028) (0.044) (0.057) (0.023)
number of children squared -0.004 -0.003 -0.014** -0.021*** -0.007**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003)
how many grandchildren 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.011*** 0.007*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
partner present in the household -0.062 -0.053 -0.048 -0.050 -0.015
(0.052) (0.061) (0.079) (0.085) (0.044)
age of the oldest child -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004)
poorhealth 0.016 0.009 0.036* 0.016 0.031**
(0.015) (0.014) (0.019) (0.027) (0.015)
IHS total earnings -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.005** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
IHS net financial wealth 0.001 0.001 -0.004** -0.002 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
IHS net real wealth 0.001** 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
employed or self employed -0.010 0.001 -0.016 0.006 -0.001
(0.020) (0.019) (0.028) (0.041) (0.023)
unemployed and looking for work 0.003 0.061 -0.091** -0.115* -0.084**
(0.020) (0.039) (0.044) (0.059) (0.042)
save to cover unforeseen expenses 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.007 0.000
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004)
Observations 5,053 5,053 5,053 3,191 10,389
Number of personid 1,465 1,465 1,465 928 3,043
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors clustered at household level reported in parenthesis.
All specifications include a full set of year dummies, a set of regional dummies anda quadratic term in age
to account for non linear age eﬀects (De Ree and Alessie, 2011). ’IHS’ stands for Inverse Hyperbolic Sine’
transformation. In column 1 the dependent variable takes value 1 only if the parent is transferring at the monent
of the interview. In column 2 the dependent is 1 if the parent is transferring and transfers to family members are
above 10000 euros per year. The last column includes an interaction with total wealth
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Table 5: Alternative proxy for credit constraints
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES baseline inters house gchild
number of children 0.092** 0.092** 0.096** 0.089**
(0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045)
number of children squared -0.015*** -0.014** -0.016*** -0.014**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
how many grandchildren 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
partner present in the household -0.048 -0.046 -0.047 -0.048
(0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079)
age of the oldest child -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
poorhealth 0.036* 0.036* 0.036* 0.036*
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
IHS total earnings 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
IHS net financial wealth -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
IHS net real wealth 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
employed or self employed -0.014 -0.008 -0.018 -0.011
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
unemployed and looking for work -0.089** -0.082* -0.090** -0.086**
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
save to cover unforeseen expenses 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
prob child has first child OR buys house 0.504**
(0.241)
prob child has first child AND buys house 9.557**
(4.434)
prob a child buys a house 0.812**
(0.379)
prob a child has a first child 0.726*
(0.433)
Observations 5,053 5,053 5,053 5,053
Number of personid 1,465 1,465 1,465 1,465
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors clustered at household level reported in parenthesis.
All specifications include a full set of year dummies, a set of regional dummies and a quadratic term in age
to account for non linear age eﬀects (De Ree and Alessie, 2011). ’IHS’ stands for Inverse Hyperbolic Sine’
transformation.
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Figure 1: PLAN, age profiles of each answer category
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Figure 2: Hazard rates by age
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Figure 3: Credit limit proxies, by cohort
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